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 Over the past 20 years, there has been a trend in American politics for college graduates 
to identify with the Democratic party and to fall to the left on the ideology scale.  College 
graduates of today are both more liberal than previous college graduates as well as their 
contemporary non-college graduate counterparts.  Previous research disagrees on what 
mechanisms are driving this growing education gap in American politics.  Some point to 
selection effects while others argue that college socializes students to move to the left.  Using 
data from the Political Engagement Project (2003-2005), I argue that the process that is 
occurring is a mix of these two ideas, fitting an Input-Environment-Output model.  While college 
students as a whole do come in leaning to the left, college has a mildly liberalizing effect on 
students, so that college graduates as a whole exit leaning more to the left than they did when 
they entered.  I also point out some factors which predispose students to ideological change or 
stability during college.  
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1. Introduction 
A tagline to an article by a conservative radio talk show host reads: “When you send your 
child to college, you are playing Russian roulette with their character” (Prager 2019).  The article 
goes on to talk about how college students in America are becoming more leftist, turning against 
traditional American values, and are becoming less happy, which is central to a good character 
(Prager 2019).  He argues that college is to blame for students becoming more liberal, and on the 
surface level, this appears to be true.  Since 2004, there has been a growing gap in the political 
leanings of college graduates in America.  According to a poll conducted by Pew Research 
Center, as of 2017, 58% of college graduates identify with or lean towards the Democratic party 
while 36% identify or lean towards the Republican party (Pew 2018).  This divide is even larger 
among those with postgraduate experience as 63% identify as Democrats and only 31% identify 
as Republican (Pew 2018).   
An argument could be made that these are just the effects of millennials, who have more 
liberal political leanings, coming of age and graduating college (Pew 2018).  However, if this 
was the case we would likely see the same trend among those with only a high school degree, but 
we do not see this (Pew 2018).  This recent educational divide is important in the American 
political system as college graduates are overrepresented among those who vote (Pew 2018).  In 
2008, college graduates made up 27.5% of the voting age population, but were 34.1% of those 
who voted in the election (Leighley and Nagler 2014).  In contrast, those with high school 
degrees made up 31.7% of the voting age population but only 27.4% of those who voted 
(Leighley and Nagler 2014).  Therefore, the political leanings of college graduates may be vital 
for the outcome of elections in America and the policies that are implemented.  If college 
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students are truly more liberal than their counterparts due to their experiences in college, then the 
effects of college may be overstated in the political system. 
It is clear that recent college graduates are more liberal than their high school graduate 
counterparts and more liberal than previous college graduates.  However, is going to college the 
root of the cause for this trend?  Like the conservative radio talk show host quoted above, many 
conservative critics claim that liberal professors at universities are indoctrinating their students 
with liberal political views, which causes students to adopt and display these views (Mariani and 
Hewitt 2008).  This could be plausible as 60% of undergraduate instructors identify as liberal, 
and students spend a lot of time listening to their professors in class (Sachs 2020).  In addition, 
conservative Republicans have a less positive view of college’s effect on the country, with only 
46% seeing it as having a positive impact versus the overall average of 60% (Pew 2012).  While 
this indoctrination theory may be popular among critics of higher education, it is unlikely that 
students are being indoctrinated during college as many come to college with their political 
views already formed.   
Another view on what is causing this gap is that those with more liberal political views 
are more likely to choose and be able to afford a college education, producing the effect that 
college graduates are more liberal (Campbell and Horowitz 2016).  Under this view, it is 
uncommon for college students to change their political leanings while in college as they simply 
continue to hold the views that they entered college with.  This selection effect theory contends 
that college students are already liberal when entering college because they come from 
backgrounds which are associated with having a liberal ideology, such as coming from a higher 
socioeconomic status family or having college educated parents, which also make them more 
likely to attend college.   
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A third view comes from the foundational work on political attitudes in college students 
which concludes that political socialization while in college causes changes in student’s political 
views (Kowalski 2007).  Political socialization does not necessarily only occur during college, 
but often occurs when an individual is younger as they learn and develop their political ideology 
through interactions with those around them, especially their family.  However, some argue that 
there is something special about the college experience and culture which socializes students to 
form new political ideologies.  If this is the case, then college students have a fundamentally 
different experience than other individuals, which plays an important part in forming their liberal 
ideology and raises questions about the implication of the inequality of access to the higher 
education system. 
Despite the disagreements in previous research, it remains a fact that some college 
students do change their political views in college.  In this study, I look at what mechanisms and 
factors about college affect these students’ change in political views, and what may cause other 
students to have stable political views.  I aim to analyze the conservative criticism of political 
indoctrination by college professors and the process of political socialization among college 
students.  I want to understand why college students are more liberal than in the past and more 
liberal than their non-college graduate contemporaries.  I use longitudinal data from the Political 
Engagement Project (2003-2005), looking at measures of political ideology change and stability, 
as well as possible factors which might affect the likelihood of an individual to experience 
ideological change or stability, such as demographics, other pre-college factors, and college 
experiences.  Based on the data that I use, I argue that while college students do enter college 
leaning to the left as a whole, they end leaning farther to the left due to their educational 
experiences in college.  Therefore, the selection effect does not hold true for all cases.  However, 
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on the individual level, a majority of students remain ideologically stable during college and it is 
rare for students to totally reverse their ideology, so college only has a mild effect on liberalizing 
students.  
2. Literature Review   
 Research on the effect of college attendance on political attitudes has led to mixed 
results.  On the one hand, several researchers claim that college does not have an effect on an 
individual’s political beliefs and attitudes.  On the other hand, several researchers assert that 
college does have an effect on political attitudes.  Within this body of thought, the view on what 
about college has an influence differs. 
Evidence for the argument that college has no effect on political attitudes 
 In a 1971 survey conducted by Richard Braungart, he looks at the political attitudes of 
students from eastern colleges and universities.  His sample consists of students from partisan 
political groups from these schools as well as students in introductory courses from 4 universities 
to supplement this data.  Braungart finds that family politics is the strongest predictor of student 
politics, followed by the parents’ religion and social class (Braungart 1971).  It is inferred that 
college has a minimal effect on the student’s political attitude.  Therefore, Braungart would 
support the idea that pre-college factors have a greater influence on students’ political views. 
 As a follow up to this study, in 2016 Colin Campbell and Jonathan Horowitz released 
their findings from their own research.  Using data from the 1994 Study of American Families 
and General Social Survey, Campbell and Horowitz compare political views of siblings to look 
at the effects of college on political attitudes while controlling for family background.  They 
measure political ideology on a seven-item scale, as well as support for civil liberties and 
opposition to gender equality (Campbell and Horowitz 2016).  Using a fixed effect model, they 
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find that the relationship between college and a liberal political ideology is confounded by 
unmeasured family backgrounds (Campbell and Horowitz 2016).  Their findings support what 
they call the “spurious model” which is the idea that “measured and unmeasured family 
background characteristics are the primary driver of both college completion and social 
outcomes” (Campbell and Horowitz 2016).  This concept lines up with the self-selection 
hypothesis that students from certain backgrounds which predispose them to be more 
ideologically liberal are more likely to attend and graduate from college. 
 Based on the Roy Model from economics, the self-selection hypothesis contends that 
observed relationships can be seen as influenced by pre-existing conditions of the individual 
rather than as a causal relationship shaped by an external factor.  Individuals choose to partake in 
an event or action due to existing characteristics of the individual.  In the case of college, people 
with certain resources and mindsets choose to go to college.  Recently, the characteristics that are 
associated with a higher likelihood of attending college are having parents with higher levels of 
wealth and educational status, as well as the students believing in gender egalitarianism (Sachs 
2020).  These factors are also associated with liberal political ideologies (Sachs 2020).  This 
would have the effect of making college graduates more liberal as a whole than those without a 
college degree.  If the self-selection hypothesis is true, we would see college students leaving 
college with the same political opinions they entered with.  Furthermore, important 
socioeconomic factors would be associated with ideological stability. 
 This research points to the idea that a student’s background, specifically their family 
background, is more important in determining their political ideology than their experiences in 
college.  The socioeconomic status of an individual’s family plays an integral role in shaping 
their political ideology as well as determining whether or not the individual will attend college.  
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As a high socioeconomic status today is associated with college attendance and ideological 
liberalism, then college students and graduates will likely be ideologically liberal.  However, 
while this theory may describe why college attendees are more liberal than those who do not 
attend college, it alone cannot explain why some students do change their ideology in college, 
and the fact remains that a decent portion of college students change their ideology in college.  
This is where other theories must come into the discussion which can explain the ideological 
changes of college students.  
Evidence for the argument that college does have an effect of political attitude formation: 
Political Socialization 
 Socialization can broadly be defined as “the process by which persons acquire the 
knowledge, skills, and dispositions that make them more or less effective members of their 
society” (Weidman 1989).  John Weidman, a professor at the University of Pittsburgh, provides 
a framework for how the socialization process works in college.  He recognizes norms and social 
integration as well as reference groups and social relationships as important parts of socialization 
in college (Weidman 1989).  Furthermore, he argues that there are six dimensions which impact 
student development during college: “clarity and consistency of institutional objectives; 
institutional size; curriculum, teaching, and evaluation; residence hall arrangements; faculty and 
administration interaction with students; and friends, groups, and student culture” (Weidman 
1989).  Tying this together, Weidman proposes that students enter with certain values and 
personal goals, are exposed to socialization influences at college, weigh these new values in 
relation to normative pressures and personal aspirations, and either change or maintain the values 
they entered college with (Weidman 1989).  Therefore, the more a student is engaged with these 
influences during college, the more likely they will be to experience a change in ideology. 
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 In 1943, Theodore Newcomb released his study that has become the foundational work 
for political socialization in college students.  From 1935-1939, Newcomb collected survey data 
from students at Bennington College.  At the time, Bennington College was an all-female school 
drawing from mostly conservative families while the social climate of the school was more 
liberal (Kowalski 2007).  Newcomb found that many students had changes in political attitudes 
from conservative to liberal (Kowalski 2007).  He concluded that the liberal attitudes of the 
institution were perceived as the social norm and that this norm became a reference group for the 
students in the process of political socialization (Kowalski 2007).  A major predictor that 
Newcomb found for a change in attitude of a student was the student’s degree of involvement in 
the college community (Kowalski 2007).  Connecting Newcomb’s findings to Weidman’s 
framework, the Bennington College study supports friends, peers, and student culture as 
important aspects to college socialization, while adding another significant feature of university 
culture as an influence on political socialization in college students.  As a follow up, Newcomb 
surveyed the students 20 years later and found that their attitudes remained fairly stable 
overtime, indicating there is a lasting effect of political socialization during college (Kowalski 
2007).   Since the Bennington College study, there have been numerous reports on the college 
socialization process in students.  From the Bennington study, we would expect to see that 
students who are highly involved in campus life are more likely to experience a change in 
ideology. 
Peer and Social Group Influences 
 Following the work of both Weidman and Newcomb is the view that college peer and 
social interactions influence political socialization and attitude change.  In 1967, Kenneth 
Langton examined the impact of class climate in peer groups and schools in the socialization of 
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political attitudes.  He found that working class students who went to heterogeneous schools 
have different views than working class student who went to homogenous schools (Langton 
1967).  From this he concludes that student peer groups teach American culture and student 
subculture, thus playing a vital role in the political socialization process (Langton 1967).  
Drawing from a larger population, Eric Dey uses data from the Higher Education Research 
Institute (HERI) to examine the influence of peers and social influences on undergraduate 
political attitudes (Dey 1996).  He finds that college peers have a positive influence on a 
student’s political attitudes.  Furthermore, George Kuh, through interviews with college seniors, 
finds that conversations with peers are identified by these students as having an influence on 
their personal development and social learning (Kuh 1995).  Jeffrey Milem expands on the 
concept of peer influence and argues that the role of peer groups depends on the group’s size, 
homogeneity, isolation, and importance of the group’s attitudes to the individual (Milem 1998).   
 Looking at a specific example of an important social group, P. Wesley Routon and Jay K. 
Walker examine the effects of Greek Life on members.  Drawing on data from HERI, they find 
that university students in Greek organizations become more liberal towards issues such as 
marijuana legalization and casual sex during their time at college (Routon and Walker 2016).  
They are able to show that these attitude changes are due to the student’s involvement in the 
organization as the Greek life members’ views on political issues converge over time (Routon 
and Walker 2016).  They argue that the homogenous culture of Greek life creates the 
homogenous views of the members, just as Milem pointed to group homogeneity as an important 
factor for the role of peer and group influence on political socialization (Milem 1998; Routon 
and Walker 2016). 
 12 
 However, not all students at a college or university are socialized in the same direction.  
Fred Kaiser and J. Robert Lilly conducted a study at a college in Pennsylvania of students who 
were registered to vote.  They find limited political attitude convergence within the student 
population as a whole (Kaiser and Lilly 1975).  Rather, students within certain organizations see 
an attitude convergence with the other students in those organizations (Kaiser and Lilly 1975).  
They therefore argue that there are multiple sources of influence of political attitudes in college 
(Kaiser and Lilly 1975).  While this creates the picture that college students as a whole do not 
have congruent political attitudes, college peer and social groups do play a role in political 
socialization and therefore the likelihood that a college student will experience a change in 
ideology during those four years. 
 These studies support the idea that political socialization does occur during college, and 
that peers play a large role in this.  What needs to be better understood is how the frequency of 
interaction with peers affects whether or not a student will be socialized and change their views.  
Furthermore, the types of interactions and conversations that students have with their peers may 
influence the likelihood of change.  For example, conversations about political issues may by 
their nature have a larger impact on the ideological change of students than conversations on 
topics which are irrelevant to ideological identification. 
Faculty Influences  
Another factor about college that Weidman, as well as conservative critics, point to as 
having an influence on socialization is influence from faculty.  In addition to his findings on peer 
influence, Dey finds that faculty have an influence on students at a positive and equal magnitude 
of peers (Dey 1996).  Conversely, more recent research shows that faculty do not have such an 
impact on political socialization and political attitude formation of college students.  Mack 
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Mariani and Gordon Hewitt take data on students from HERI as wells as the faculty survey from 
HERI.  From descriptive statistics, they find that 43% of students show a shift in political 
orientation from freshman to senior year (Mariani and Hewitt 2008).  Yet when they compare the 
changes of student ideology to the faculty ideology, they do not find any association (Mariani 
and Hewitt 2008).  Therefore, the role of faculty on changes in student political attitudes remains 
unclear, yet conservative critics still contend that indoctrination of students by liberal professors 
is why college graduates are more liberal and why American higher education should be 
reformed (Sachs 2020) .  Because of this, there is still much to understand about how faculty and 
their academic curriculum may shape students’ views.  
Academic Influences   
 A third influence which Weidman discusses as having a role in political socialization for 
college students is academic curriculum, teaching, and evaluation.  Jana Hanson investigates 
whether liberal arts colleges make college students more liberal.  She collects data from the 
Wabash National Study of Liberal Arts Education and compares the political views of students 
who did attend liberal arts colleges to those who did not attend liberal arts colleges (Hanson et al. 
2012).  She finds that while college students who attended liberal arts colleges came in with 
more politically liberal views, they also make greater changes to have more liberal views over 
the course of their college career (Hanson et al. 2012).   
 A second source of academic influence on a college student’s political socialization is the 
student’s major and class choice.  Christine Ma-Kellams et al. examine the effects of a degree in 
science on political attitudes.  With data from a university in New England, they find that 
education in a science-related discipline is associated with greater political liberalism (Ma-
Kellams et al. 2014).  Importantly, they find no self-selection effect so that it is not the case that 
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students with more liberal political attitudes choose to go into a science-related discipline.  
Furthermore, the individual classes that students take are seen to be important for political 
attitude changes.  With data from HERI, Alyssa Bryant looks at students’ attitudes towards 
married women.  She finds that taking a women’s study course has an effect in shaping the 
student’s changing gender-role attitudes (Bryant 2003).  Overall, academic curriculum has been 
seen to have an effect on student political attitudes, so we would expect to see certain majors and 
course topics being associated with a change in political ideology. 
 While academics does appear to have an influence, there are many nuances that are still 
not understood.  First, while the literature above addresses science majors, it is unknown whether 
other majors influence political ideology.  Second, just as gender study classes affect views on 
gender roles, political science courses may have a certain impact on political views.  Lastly, the 
impact of class activities remains unknown, as different types of class assignments may have 
different impacts on the students’ learning and formation of political ideology. 
College Culture  
 Something that Newcomb discusses in his findings but is not present in Weidman’s 
framework is the idea of college culture.  In the Bennington Study, Newcomb discusses the 
culture at Bennington College as being politically liberal (Kowalski 2007).  Newcomb finds that 
many of the students change from having conservative to liberal political views (Kowalski 
2007).  He argues that this change is due to the individual student’s degree of involvement in the 
college community (Kowalski 2007).  Therefore, it is the liberal culture of the college that is 
impacting the students.  If student groups and social ties were the sole influencers of political 
views at Bennington, then a growing conservative trend would likely have been observed rather 
than a liberalization trend.   
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 Subsequent studies on political attitudes of college students have also highlighted the 
impact of college culture.  In 1974, Henry Finney measured levels of civil-libertarianism in 
undergraduate students at UC Berkeley.  Finney measured civil-libertarianism as the support for 
the free speech of political dissenters, emphasizing those with left-wing/communist beliefs and 
liberal dissent in academic settings (Finney 1974).  He finds that exposure to UC Berkeley’s 
political subculture (climate) does have an effect, although modest, on the students’ support for 
civil-liberties (Finney 1974).  Finney defines the political subculture of the school as “a 
distinctive climate of widely held political attitudes and beliefs in a community which both 
supports, and is influenced by, recurrent styles of political behavior by some portion of the 
population in that community” (Finney 1974).   
 More recently, Tali Mendelberg et al. looked at the influence of affluent schools on 
students’ economic views.  These researchers use data from HERI for the years 1989-2001 and 
their sample includes 359 affluent schools (Mendelberg, McCabe, and Thal 2017).  Specifically, 
they are looking at measures of students’ views on taxing the wealthy as well as other economic 
issues (Mendelberg et al. 2017).  They find that these affluent schools promote “class cultural 
norms” meaning that these students grow to support economic policies which benefit upper-class 
citizens (Mendelberg et al. 2017).  An argument could be made that there is a selection effect 
happening here as students with affluent backgrounds choose to go to affluent schools.  
However, Mendelberg et al. find that college socialization is influencing the preferences of these 
students as a change in opinion is especially observed among socially embedded students 
(Mendelberg et al. 2017).  This study does not support Newcomb’s original findings that college 
has a liberalizing effect on the students through socialization, but it does show that college 
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culture is an important aspect in political socialization in college students no matter the political 
leanings of the university. 
 Jo Phelan et al. find a similar effect in regards to conservative economic views among 
college students.  The authors argue that both economic and social attitudes need to be taken into 
consideration when measuring college attitude formation (Phelan et al. 1995).  To measure both 
sets of attitudes, they choose the issue of homelessness (Phelan et al. 1995).  They conduct phone 
interviews with a random sample of American adults and find that a college education is 
associated with a greater tolerance for homeless people but less support for economic aid to the 
homeless (Phelan et al. 1995).  They reason that their findings provide support for the 
socialization model as “education socializes students to the ‘official culture,’ which in the United 
States includes values of equal opportunity and equal respect—but not equal outcomes” (Phelan 
et al. 1995).  In this case, the culture of college campuses would be one that reflects the larger 
culture of the United States and works to socialize the students to this culture. 
 While these studies highlight the importance of college culture on shaping students’ 
ideology, college culture is not always easy to define or pick up on in surveys.  Therefore, it may 
be difficult to measure exactly how college culture affects students’ ideology.  This is especially 
difficult when surveys draw from multiple schools.  Furthermore, these studies were conducted 
at the end of the 20th century.  The culture of America and of college campuses has changed 
since then, so the cultural impact and size of impact may have changed too. 
Input-Environment-Outcome Model  
 Another way to look at the way that college influences students’ political attitudes is 
through Astin’s “input-environment-outcome model” (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
2019).  Astin’s model looks at the input and how it influences both the environment and the 
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outcome directly, with the environment also influencing the outcome (University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee 2019).  This model therefore takes into consideration the selection effect that might 
occur in the college selection process.  A student’s individual qualities and characteristics 
influence whether or not they go to college and if they do, where they go to college (Univeristy 
of Wiconsin-Milwaukee 2019).  The college that they choose then has an influence on their 
political attitudes, which is also influenced by their individual qualities and characteristics that 
they possessed before entering college (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 2019).  The 
environment in this model refers to college classes as well as out-of-classroom experiences such 
as extracurricular activities, living arrangements, campus culture, etc. (University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee 2019).  Therefore, when analyzing the effects of a college education on an 
individual’s political attitudes, it is important to consider factors about the individual that were 
present before they started college and how these affected the student’s experiences in college.  
This fits more with the idea that college has only a mildly liberalizing effect on college students, 
as while a majority of students do not change their ideology, those who do change are more 
likely to move to the left than to the right. 
3. College Students and the American Political Climate 
To understand why determining whether or not attending college today affects an 
individual’s political ideology and what about college causes this change, it is important to look 
at how college graduates of today are different from both college graduates of the past and 
current individuals who have not graduated college.  Americans with a college education make 
up a larger share of registered voters than they did 25 years ago.  In 1992, 23% of registered 
voters held a college degree while 50% of voters did not (Pew 2016).  In 2016, 33% of registered 
voters held a college degree and 33% did not (Pew 2016).  The other 34% are made up of 
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individuals with some college education (Pew 2016).  Importantly, this increase in college 
educated voters is not evenly distributed between the two major parties.  Among registered 
Democrats, in 1992 only 22% of the party had a college degree while 55% had a high school 
degree or less (Pew 2016).  By 2016, 37% of registered Democrats held a college degree (Pew 
2016).  The proportion of Democrats with a high school degree or less dropped to 32% (Pew 
2016).  The Democratic party, once the party of working-class Americans, has transitioned into 
the party of college educated Americans.  This is especially exemplified by the decrease of non-
college whites as a part of the Democratic party.  In 1992, non-college whites made up 59% of 
the Democratic party; by 2016 they only made up 32% of the party (Pew 2016).  It is this 
demographic group that is driving the decrease in the proportion of non-college educated voters 
in the Democratic party, especially since the proportion of non-college educated non-whites in 
the Democratic party has increased.   
The Republican party on the other hand has seen a different trend.  While the proportion 
of college graduates in the Republican party has increased, it has not increased as much as it did 
in the Democratic party.  In 1992, 28% of registered Republicans held a college degree (Pew 
2016).  This amount peaked in 2008 and 2012 with 34%, but dropped down to 31% by 2016 
(Pew 2016).  The Republican party saw a net gain of only 3% of college educated voters while 
the Democratic party saw a gain of 16%, more than 5 times the amount in the Republican party.  
The uneven distribution of the increase of college educated voters to the Democratic party has 
something to do with the changing nature of college students, whether that be the type of 
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Not only is the Democratic party made up of more college educated voters than at 
previous points in history, but college educated voters are more liberal than before (Pew 2016.).  
The process of how a college student’s political ideology is shaped is important in understanding 
why Americans with a college education are now more liberal than they were in the past.  Prior 
to the 1960s and 1970s, college educated Americans leaned more conservative and identified 
more with the Republican party (Brint 1985).  However, since that time, the college educated in 
America have become more liberal than the population as a whole (Brint 1985).  Among students 
with a college degree, the amount identifying as consistently liberal has grown from 6% in 1994 
to 26% in 2015 (Pew 2016).  When combined with those identifying as mostly liberal, 47% of 
college graduates lean to the left (Pew 2016).  Those identifying as consistently or mostly 
conservative shrank from a total of 30% to 27% (Pew 2016).  The growth in those identifying as 
liberal seems to come from the reduction in those with a college education identifying as having 
a moderate ideology as the percentage of moderate college educated Americans reduced from 
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This trend of a growing liberal base has not been seen as much among the general public 
or among those with less than a college degree.  Gallup finds that while the American public is 
becoming more liberal, it still as a whole leans conservative or moderate.  In 1992, 17% of the 
American public leaned liberal while 36% leaned conservative and 43% were moderate (Gallup 
2019).  Since then, the amount of liberals in the country has grown steadily up to 26% (Gallup 
2019).  The amount of conservatives has remained fairly stable staying between 35% and 40% 
while moderates have slightly declined to 35% in 2019 (Gallup 2019).  Among the general 
public, the increase in the percentage of liberals is nowhere near the level of increase seen among 
the college educated.  This is also the case among those with less than a college education.  
Among Americans with less than a college degree, 19% identified as liberal in 1994 (Pew 2016).  
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educated Americans (Pew 2016).  Additionally, the non-college educated group has remained 
largely moderate as in 2015, 42% identified as such (Pew 2016). 
Graph 1.4 
 
Data for graph from PEW 2016 
A change in the party identification of the college educated has also been seen in the time 
since the 1990s.  According to Pew Research Center, in 1992 49% of college graduates in 
America identified as Republican or leaned Republican while 45% identified as or leaned 
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degree and since then more college graduates have identified as or leaned Democrat than 
Republican.  In 2017, 58% of those with a college degree identified as or leaned Democrat while 
only 36% identified as or leaned Republican (Pew 2018).  Among those with postgrad 
experience, the divide is even larger.  Pew finds that 63% of this group identifies as or leans 
Democrat while 31% identifies as or leans Republican (Pew 2018).  While having a higher 
education level used to be associated with being a member of the Republican Party, this is no 
longer the case (Dailey 1983). 
Furthermore, this trend among the American college educated is not just simply reflective 
of a larger trend among the American population.  Pew finds that the aggregate party 
identification of Americans as a whole has remained fairly stable since 1992.  In 1992, 36% 
identified as Democrat, 29% as Republican, and 32% as Independent (Pew 2018).  Since then, 
there has been an increase in the amount of Independents as Pew finds that 37% identify as 
Independent (Pew 2018).  However, they also find that Democrats outnumber Republicans 
among registered voters as in 2017, 33% identified as Democrat and 26% as Republican (Pew 
2018).  Gallup finds a somewhat different distribution of party identification.  Between 2004 and 
2019, identification with the Republican and Democratic parties hover around 30% each, with 
Republicans having slightly more at times and Democrats having slightly more at other times 
(Gallup 2007).  Independents also make up around a third of respondents, but reach closer to 
40% which is higher than either party (Gallup 2007).  This is different from how Pew finds that 
Democrats hold a plurality at times.  However, both trends show that Democratic and Republican 
identification remain stable over the past few decades.  This is different from the trend seen 
among the college educated and how there has been an increase in those identifying as Democrat 
and a decrease in those identifying as Republican. 
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Even within the Democratic party those with a college degree are becoming more liberal 
over time.  According to Gallup, while those in the Democratic party are now identifying as 
more liberal, those with a college degree have seen the most change.  Among those in the 
Democratic party, in 2001, 52% of those with post graduate experience and 42% of college 
graduates identified as liberal (Gallup 2019).  By 2018, these proportions increased to 65% for 
postgraduates and 58% for college graduates (Gallup 2019).  Democrats with a high school 
education or less have not become as liberal as those with a college education.  In 2001, 22% of 
this group identified as liberal and this increased to 32% in 2018 (Gallup 2019).  Not only do 
those with a college education start and end up as the most likely to identify as liberal within the 
Democratic party, but they also see the largest increase in the proportion that identify as liberal 
(Gallup 2019).  This is true not only by education level, but also when compared to other 
demographic measures such as race, age, and gender (Gallup 2019).  Therefore, it is seen that 
having a college education, especially a postgraduate degree, is the greatest predictor of 
identifying as liberal as a Democrat. 
For white Americans without a four-year college, Gallup finds that the trend is for these 
individuals to identify more with the Republican party.  In 1999, 44% of this group identified as 
Republican or leaning Republican and 44% identified as Democrat or leaning Democratic 
(Gallup 2019).  By 2019, the amount of non-college whites who identified as Republican 
increased to 59% and the amount who identified as Democrat decreased to 34% (Gallup 2019).  
This has given Republicans a net advantage of 25 points among white college-nongraduates in 
America (Gallup 2019).  Overall, Americans in general without a college degree are more likely 
to identify as conservative.  In 2019, 43% of college-nongraduates identified as conservative and 
19% as liberal (Gallup 2020).  With this information, a clear political divide can be seen between 
 25 
college graduates and college-nongraduates in terms of both party identification and political 
ideology. 
The changing political affiliation of college graduates is associated with a partisan view 
on the importance and effects of attaining a college education.  Both Pew and Gallup find that 
Democrats have a more positive view of college than Republicans do.  A 2019 Gallup poll found 
that 41% of Republicans said college was important and 18% said college was not too important 
(Gallup 2019).  On the other hand, 62% of Democrats said college was very important and only 
6% said it was not too important (Gallup 2019).  Independents fall in between the two parties on 
their opinions about college as well as the US adult population as a whole (Gallup 2019).  In a 
Pew survey, Republicans saw college as having a less positive effect than Democrats.  In the 
survey, 51% of Republicans saw college as having a positive effect and this was even lower 
among conservative Republicans at 46% (Pew 2012).  On the other hand, 67% of Democrats 
viewed college as having positive effects (Pew 2012).  Interestingly enough, more Republicans 
than Democrats saw college as having been a good personal investment as 87% of Republicans 
said it was and 81% of Democrats said it was (Pew 2012).   
However, a different Pew poll finds that there is a partisan divide in how individuals view 
colleges and the effects of college on the country.  Between 2012 and 2019, Democrats had a 
consistently positive view of the effects of college on the country remaining above 67% (Parker 
2019).  Republicans on the other hand have had a change of views.  In 2012, 53% of Republicans 
saw it as positive and 35% as negative (Parker 2019).  In 2019 however, only 33% saw it as 
positive and 59% saw it as negative (Parker 2019).  This is exemplified by the article written by 
the conservative radio talk show host quoted in the introduction, saying that college destroys 
students’ character (Prager 2019).  The reasons for why individuals see college as heading in the 
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wrong direction is also divided along a partisan line.  Among Democrats, 92% see tuition costs 
as a major problem in higher education.  Around three quarters of Republicans had issues with 
tuition costs, as well as viewing that “students are not getting the skills they need to succeed in 
the workplace,” there is “too much concern about protecting students from views they might find 
offensive,” and “professors are bringing their political and social views into the classroom”  
(Parker 2019).  Furthermore, 72% of Republicans think that politics at colleges are leaning 
towards one viewpoint and 67% view this as a major problem (Parker 2019).  On the other hand, 
48% of Democrats think that politics at colleges are leaning towards one viewpoint and only 
26% see this as a major problem (Parker 2019).  This political climate of college campuses is 
central to the increase of college graduates identifying as liberal or Democrat as it could be the 
source of political socialization on campus, the effect of liberal students attending college at 
higher rates, or the reason why possible conservative students opt out of going to college. 
4. Methodology 
Data 
 To analyze political-attitude change in college students, it is necessary to use a data set 
that contains multiple key elements.  First and foremost, the set needs to be longitudinal so that 
actual individual level change can be measured and observed so that we do not need to rely on 
self-reported perceptions of change which are not always accurate.  Ideally the data would cover 
all four years of college, but this is not necessary.  While repeated cross-sectional data could be 
used to measure broad changes and trends among a certain population, it is not possible to 
measure individual change using these types of data sets since different respondents are used.  
Panel data is important because the same individuals are used in each wave, so individual level 
change can be measured.  Since individual level change is my dependent variable for this study, 
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it is important that any data set I use allows for this to be measured.  Furthermore, we cannot rely 
on data that asks students about their previous opinions or previous events.  Retrospective 
surveys are less reliable because there are issues with recall and memory bias. These 
psychological processes can affect the way that individuals remember ideas or events and how 
these ideas and events are retold in survey answers.  Conscious or subconscious processes will 
alter how people remember things to make them fit with their current mindset.  With the 
limitations of these other types of methods of data collection, using a panel data set for this 
project is the best way to go.   
However, panel data sets are hard to come by.  Data collection for panel studies is 
expensive and takes a long time, so panel data sets are not as common.  While panel data is the 
best sort of data for this study, it is not without its faults.  Primarily, there is the issue of 
“differential mortality,” or that the sample may be somewhat unrepresentative due to the fact that 
people have dropped out between waves.  These people who dropped out may be different from 
the people who stayed in the study, and these may be important differences.  However, due to the 
fact that they dropped out of the study, these differences cannot be measured and accounted for 
in the analysis.  This can then create an issue of how representative the sample really is of the 
broader population. 
Second, the data set population needs to be made up of college students who are fairly 
representative of the college student population as a whole.  This aspect is important for the 
ability to generalize the findings of the study to a broader population beyond the sample.  Third, 
the data set must contain variables to measure political attitude change.  This includes a 
measurement of political ideology and political party of the individual in the first and second 
wave so that a change between the two can be measured.  Fourth, the data set must have 
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questions about both college and pre-college factors which could affect whether or not a college 
student experiences a change in political attitude.  Lastly, the data set must be contemporaneous.  
As stated above, the political composition of America has changed overtime, especially in 
relation to higher education and college graduates as a subset of the voting population.  
Furthermore, much of the previous research on this topic was conducted with data from the 20th 
century, so the findings may no longer hold true for current college students.  Therefore, to 
understand the current trends and factors influencing the ideology and attitudes of college 
students and graduates, it is important to have data that was collected fairly recently. 
In an ideal world, I would have been able to create my own survey with the first wave 
starting before freshman year and the last wave at the end of senior year and with only questions 
relevant to the information I am interested in.  However, as a senior thesis project, this was not 
possible.  Therefore, I had to rely on a secondary data set.  I chose the Political Engagement 
Project (2003-2005) as it meets the four requirements listed above. 
Sample 
Data from the Political Engagement Project (2003-2005) was collected from a range of 
colleges and universities across the United States as a part of the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching Political Engagement Project.  The data from this survey are publicly 
available from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.  Participants in 
the survey were students in one of twenty-one different undergraduate courses and co-/extra-
curricular programs which were designed to promote political engagement.  The original purpose 
of the survey was to measure four dimensions of political engagement: knowledge and 
understanding, skills, motivation, and action.  However, the survey also asked about their 
political ideology and party identification in both waves.  In addition, there are questions about 
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pre-college and college factors which have the chance of affecting political attitude change as 
seen in the previous literature.   
In total, 612 undergraduate students took part in these courses and were surveyed for the 
project.  The students come from a variety of institutions in the United States and from diverse 
backgrounds including multiple racial/ethnic minorities and a range of socioeconomic 
backgrounds.  Sixty-one percent of the respondents in the PEP were female, which is slightly 
above the 2018 national average of fifty-seven percent of undergraduate students identifying as 
female (National Center for Education Statistics).  Sixty-seven percent of the students in the PEP 
identified as white, while as a whole in the country fifty-four percent of undergraduate students 
identified as white in 2018 (NCES).  Black students made up twelve percent of the PEP 
respondents while they made up about thirteen percent of the national undergraduate student 
body in 2018 (NCES).  Because of the sample size of the survey, some groups are 
underrepresented which makes it difficult to generalize the results for them.  Furthermore, 
students majoring in politics, government, or political science are overrepresented as the PEP 
was designed to look at the effects of programs designed to promote political engagement.  
Lastly, as the data was collected in 2003-2005, current patterns in college and students may look 
slightly different as political interest has grown among college students due to the current 
political climate.  However, overall the participants in the Political Engagement Project are fairly 
representative of college students as a whole in the United States allowing the findings from the 
analysis to be generalized.  Furthermore, as the study took place between 2003 and 2005, it falls 
right in the time period where Democratic party identification overtook Republican party 
identification among college graduates as a whole in the country (Pew 2016).  Therefore, this 
data may provide an insight into this important historical change in political trends. 
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Table 1.1: Characteristics of Undergraduate Students 
 % from PEP  2018 National % from NCES 
Female 61 57 
Race: White 67 54 
Race: Black 12 13 
Major: Political Science, 
Public Policy, Government 
25 1.8 
(Percentage of bachelor’s degrees) 
Religion: Christian 45 N/A 




Measures: Political Attitude Change Through Ideology and Political Party 
 As possibilities to measure political attitude change, the PEP asked about each student’s 
political ideology and party identification.  The political ideology variable is measured on a 6-
point scale, as opposed to a 7-point scale, with 1 being extremely liberal and 6 being extremely 
conservative.  While the 7-point scale is more common in political research, the 6-point scale 
forces students to identify as leaning to one side or another as it does not allow for a true neutral 
or independent.  For party identification, students are asked which party they think of themselves 
as and have the choice of Democrat, Republican, Independent, other, or don’t know.  For the 
students who chose “other,” they are then asked to write in what they think of themselves as.   
 To measure political attitude change, I rely primarily on political ideology.  While I do 
discuss party identification when looking at broad changes in demographic groups, political 
ideology is a better measurement for political attitude change because there is more room for 
change in addition to the fact that individuals are more likely to change their ideology than their 
political party.  To determine the actual ideological change in each individual, I created a new 
variable where I subtracted the score of wave 1 from the score of wave 2 (wave 2 score – wave 
one score = ideological change).  The range of possible scores for ideological change ranged 
from -5 to +5, where having a negative change meant the individual moved to the left (became 
more liberal), a positive change meant the individual moved to the right (became more 
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conservative), and a score of 0 meant that the student did not experience a change in ideology 
between the two waves.  The measure of ideological change was the dependent variable for the 
ANOVA analysis which is described below. 
Measures: Pre-college Factors  
 For the independent variables as a part of the ANOVA analysis, I draw on factors which 
occur both before college and during college.  For the pre-college factors, I first look at the 
demographic information of the students, including their race, gender, religious identification, 
and socioeconomic background.  Furthermore, the PEP asks groups of questions which relate to 
different areas as a part of a student’s life before and outside of college.  There are four of these 
categories which are: self-perceived identity, previous political exposure, self-rated political 
interest or knowledge, and media influence.  They measure personal identity by having students 
rate how important to their sense of self different traits are.  Previous political exposure includes 
how often politics was discussed in high school or the political actions of their parents.  Political 
interest/knowledge is measured by asking students how they rate their knowledge on different 
political events or information.  Media influence is measured by how often the students absorb 
news information from different sources.  Each of these have a chance of influencing whether or 
not a student experiences an ideological change in college or if their ideology remains stable.   
Measures: College Factors 
 At the root of this project is whether or not there is anything about the college experience 
which causes a change in the political attitudes of college students.  To investigate this, I use 
multiple variables from the PEP in the ANOVA analysis described below.  These variables also 
fall into four categories which are: academics/major, extracurricular activities, socialization in 
college, and living situation.  Academic influences are measured with different questions about 
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the classes that students take and the work they do for those courses.  Extracurricular influences 
are measured through self-reported membership and participation in different clubs and 
organizations.  Socialization is measured by how often the students interact with other people. 
Finally, living situation is determined by where the student lived during the survey.  Previous 
literature from Weidman, Newcomb, Dey, Routon and Walker, and Milem has noted that each of 
these have the possibility to affect a student’s political attitude which is why I chose these 
factors.  It is important to see whether or not these factors are predictive of ideological change or 
stability to respond to the criticism that colleges and universities indoctrinate students with 
liberal attitudes.  
Analysis 
 To determine if any of these factors had an effect on whether or not a student would 
change their political ideology during college, I ran an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test with a 
Scheffe post-hoc test.  For the ANOVA test, I created three groups of which I compared means.  
The three groups are students who moved to the right, students who moved to the left, and 
students who remained stable in their ideology.  I created these groups by calculating how each 
individual student changed in ideology, and assigned them into one of the three groups 
depending on how they changed.  The degree of change on the ideology scale did not matter in 
this case, only the direction.  The groups broke down so that there were 105 respondents in the 
group that moved to the right, 133 respondents in the group that moved to the left, and 351 
students in the group that remained stable.  The presence of three groups made it so that there are 
two degrees of freedom, and the reference group was the group of students who remained stable.  
I ran the ANOVA test for variables dealing with each of the 8 factors, comparing the means for 
the three groups.  Once the null hypothesis was rejected for a variable and it was confirmed that 
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there was a statistically significant difference between the means for one of the three groups, the 
Scheffe Test then came into play.  The Scheffe test indicates which pairs of means are 
significantly different.  If a statistically significant difference is found between the means of two 
groups, then this indicates that this variable has an effect on determining the likelihood that a 
student from the group experienced a change in ideology or not.  If no difference was found, then 
that variable likely had little effect on the stability or volatility of a student’s political ideology.  
5. Findings  
Demographics  
Race 
 To begin, I take a look at the broad changes in the group population, looking at different 
demographic factors and how they relate to ideological change or stability.  Based on the overall 
divide in American political views between different races, it would be expected that different 
racial groups experience a different amount of political change in college (Pew 2018).  To start 
off, we see that white students come into these college experiences from the PEP leaning to the 
left.  In the first wave, 42.8% identified as Democrats, 20.9% identified as Republican, and 
70.2% fell to the left on the ideology scale.  Between wave one and wave two, 36.8% of white 
students experienced a change on the ideology scale with 16.2% moving to the right and 20.6% 
moving to the left.  This creates a split in wave two where 45.3% identified as Democrat and 
19.4% identified as Republican, with 71.9% falling to the left on the ideology scale.  Among 
white students, it is seen that college has a mildly liberalizing effect as more students move to the 
left than to the right and there is an increase in affiliation with the Democratic party.  Despite 
these changes, it appears that being white, as compared to other races, is not predictive of 
ideological change during college.  Based on the data from the PEP, 71% of students who 
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remained stable were white, while 64% of students who moved to the right and 63% of students 
who moved to the left were white.  While white students do appear to make up a larger portion of 
stable students than they do for students who change, there is no statistically significant 
difference between the three outcomes. 
 Among black students, we see somewhat of a different trend.  In wave one, 70.8% of 
black students identified as a Democrat.  In wave two, 75.3% of black students identified as 
Democrat while no black students identified as Republican in either wave.  (This is not to say 
that no black college students in America identify as Republican, only that among this sample 
none did.)  This increase in students identifying as Democrat comes from students who did not 
know their party identification in wave one sorting themselves into a party in wave two.  
Furthermore, 79.7% fell to the left on the ideology scale in wave one.  In the time between the 
waves, 37% of black students experienced a change on the ideology scale.  Of these students, 
59.2% moved to the left and 40.7% moved to the right.  In this instance, moving to the right does 
not necessarily mean that these students became conservative; rather, because many of them 
entered leaning far to the left, they could only stay the same or move to be less liberal, but still 
on the left on the ideology scale.  This may be because their political identity was shaped by their 
racial identity before coming to college so that college had little effect on their political leanings.  
Based on this concept, we might assume that being black would be predictive of a stable 
ideology in college students as their race, which is a permanent factor, is likely central in the 
process of shaping their political ideology.  However, the analysis of the PEP data shows that 
being black is not predictive of any certain type of ideological change in college as compared to 
being of another race.  Black students make up a roughly equal percentage of students in each of 
the three categories, where black students are 10% of those who moved to the right, 12% of 
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those who moved to the left, and 12% of those who remained stable.  Therefore, the racial 
identity of black students does not appear to have an influence on how these students’ political 
ideology will change in college.  The assumption that a black student’s racial identity is central 
to the formation of the political ideology is not necessarily true in all cases. 
 Hispanic and Asian students followed a similar trend to white students where they came 
in leaning to the left and ended leaning farther to the left.  In wave one, 51.7% of Hispanic 
students identified as Democrat and only 8.3% as Republican.  On the ideology scale, 80% fell to 
the left during wave one.  Between the two waves, 58.3% of Hispanic students experienced a 
change in their political leanings, which is a larger share of students than among white students.  
In wave two, 58.3% of Hispanic students identified as Democrat and 6.7% identified as 
Republican while 86.7% fell to the left on the ideology scale.  Being Hispanic does appear to be 
predictive of an ideological change during college based on analysis from the PEP.  Among 
students who remained stable, 7% were Hispanic, while 13% of those who moved to the right 
and 16% of those who moved to the left were Hispanic.  There is a statistically significant 
difference between the stable group and the group that moved to the left, so that Hispanic 
students were more likely to move to the left than remain ideologically stable during college.  
Among Asian students, 58.8% came in as Democrats and 62.7% left as Democrats.  Not as many 
Asian students experience a change in ideological leaning as 39.7% did.  Something that is 
interesting about Asian students is that in wave one, 83.8% leaned to the left while in wave two 
79.4% leaned to the left.  This is a slight decline, but may be indicative of something about Asian 
students’ experiences in college being different from the rest of their peers.  Yet, it does not 
appear that this experience is directly tied to their racial identity, as being Asian is not predictive 
of a move to the right, nor a move to the left or ideological stability.  For the three groups, 12% 
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of students who remained stable were Asian, 10% of students who moved to the right were 
Asian, and 13% of students who moved to the left were Asian.   
Table 2.1 Race and Political Party/Ideological Leaning 
 Wave 1: % 
Democrat 
Wave 2: % 
Democrat 
Wave 1: % 
Republican 
Wave 2: % 
Republican 
Wave 1: % 
Leaning to 
the Left 
Wave 2: % 
Leaning to 
the Left 
White 42.8% 45.3% 20.9% 19.4% 70.2% 71.9% 
Black 70.8% 75.3% 0.0% 0.0% 79.7% 79.2% 
Hispanic 51.7% 58.3% 8.3% 6.7% 80.0% 86.7% 
Asian 58.8% 62.75 5.9% 4.5% 83.8% 79.4% 
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Table 2.2: One-Way ANOVA for Race 
 
Gender 
 Another area where a difference is seen among subgroups of a demographic is in gender.  
Among the public as a whole, there is a gender gap where in general, women lean Democratic 
and men lean Republican (Pew 2018).  However, this gap is somewhat mediated in the PEP by 
the fact that all of these respondents are college educated, so they lean more to the left than the 
nation as a whole.  To begin, women in wave one are more liberal than men in wave one.  
Among women, 51.1% start as a Democrat, 13.0% as Republican, and 78% fall to the left on the 
ideology scale.  Men come in as 43.3% identifying as a Democrat, 19.7% as Republican, and 
66.4% are on the left of the ideology scale.  In wave two, women are still more liberal than men 
as 53.4% of women are Democrats and 49.1% of men are Democrats.  Also, in wave two, 12.1% 
of women are Republicans while 17.5% of men are Republicans.  Based on these percentages, 
not only are women more liberal than men, but women start off as more Democratic than men 
end. 
 A fascinating difference between men and women that emerges from this survey is the 
difference in how they change on the ideology scale.  Among female students, 36.2% experience 
a change and of those students, 60.9% move to the left and 39.1% move to the right.  On the 
other hand, a larger percentage of men experience a change on the ideology scale as 44.5% have 
a change.  Furthermore, among the male students who change, 50% move to the left and 50% 
 Moved 
rightA  
(N = 105) 
StableB 
(N = 351)  
Moved 
leftC 




 % % %   
Race      
     White .64 .71 .63 1.80 N/A 
     Black .10 .12 .12 .066 N/A 
     Hispanic .13 .07 .16 4.59** BC 
     Asian .10 .12 .13 .283 N/A 
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move to the right.  This is especially interesting considering that men saw a larger jump in the 
percentage identifying as Democrat between the two waves than women did.  So, it may be the 
case here that college influences more men to identify as Democrat, but does not necessarily 
have an overwhelming influence on moving their ideology to the left. 
 Furthermore, the gender of a student is predictive of a change or stability in ideology 
during college.  Among students who moved to the right, 50% were male and 50% were female.  
Among students who moved to the left, 40% were male and 60% were female.  Among students 
who remained stable, 36% were male and 64% were female.  For men, there is a statistically 
significant difference between moving to the right and remaining stable, where being male is 
predictive of moving to the right.  For women, there is also a statistically significant difference 
between moving to the right and remaining stable; but in this case, being female is predictive of 
stability.  A reason for why women are more likely to remain stable during college is because 
their gender identity has been central to the formation of their political ideology, and this does 
not change during college.  Another reason may be that women are more interested in politics 
and have greater political knowledge going into college so that their political opinions are 
already formed and crystalized.  On the other hand, men may not see their gender identity as 
being central in the formation of their political opinions or they are not as politically interested or 
knowledgeable going into college.  While men are more likely to move to the right than to 
remain stable, they are not statistically more likely to move to the right than to move to the left, 
which is why we see an equal amount of men who change during college moving in either 
direction. 
 This finding is somewhat surprising in comparison to what Fred Greenstein found in his 
study on children and politics.  Greenstein finds that women as a whole are less politically 
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interested, meaning that they participate less in politics and have more vague opinions about 
politics (Greenstein 1969).  He cites studies showing that adolescent females are less politically 
interested than males and that boys are better politically informed than girls (Greenstein 1969).  
He hypothesizes that the reason for this is that men are viewed as the politically dominant figures 
in society, so boys are more likely than girls to take on this role (Greenstein 1969).  He also 
posits that boys are more prone to being interested in social studies, which lends itself to politics, 
while girls are more interested in humanities (Greenstein 1969).  If what Greenstein finds were 
truly the case, then we would expect to see women being more open to political change during 
college.  If women were not exposed to as much political information during their youth, then 
they would have more to learn as they grow older, and college would be a major source of this.  
Therefore, we would expect to see similar findings to those of Newcomb at Bennington, with the 
female college students being more open to ideological change.   
However, with the PEP we see the opposite pattern.  Women are more likely than men to 
have a stable political ideology, while men are more likely to change.  This indicates that women 
may have more political interest and knowledge going into college than men do, which is a 
reverse in the trend seen in Greenstein’s study.  One explanation for this is that times have 
simply changed.  Greenstein was writing in the 1960s, and the PEP data was taken in the 2000s, 
forty years later.  The social climate around gender and politics has changed so that it is more 
acceptable for women to have their own political opinions and men are not seen as the sole 
dominant political figures in society.  Furthermore, more time has passed since the ratification of 
the 19th Amendment so that women are increasingly taking on the role of being politically 
engaged.  Whatever the case may be, it seems that women, more so than men, are forming their 
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political opinions earlier in life so that they are less influenced by factors later in life, such as 
going to college. 
Table 2.3: Gender and Political Party/Ideological Leaning 
 Wave 1: % 
Democrat 
Wave 2: % 
Democrat 
Wave 1: % 
Republican 
Wave 2: % 
Republican 
Wave 1: % 
Leaning to 
the Left 
Wave 2: % 
Leaning to 
the Left 
Female 51.1% 53.4% 13.0% 12.1% 78.0% 79.4% 























Wave 1 Wave 2
Gender and Party Identification  




Table 2.4: One-Way ANOVA for Gender 
 
Religion 
 From the PEP, three major religious groups can be formed: Christians, non-Christians, 
and those who are non-religious.  Among Christians during wave one, 38.1% identified as 
Democrat and 26.3% identified as Republican.  Furthermore, 61.5% fell to the left on the 
ideology scale.  Between the two waves, 44.2% of Christian students experienced a change on 
the ideology scale, with 52.9% of these students moving to the left and 47.1% moving to the 
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(N = 105) 
StableB 
(N = 351)  
Moved 
leftC 




 % % %   
Gender      
     Male .50 .36 .40 3.67* AB 
     Female .50 .64 .60 3.67* AB 
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Republican.  Additionally, in wave two 63.1% of students lean to the left on the ideology scale.  
Among Christians, students are seen to be moving to the left, but liberals do not dominate this 
groups as much as they do for non-Christians or non-religious students.  Despite this apparent 
leftward change, analysis from the PEP indicates that being Christian is actually somewhat 
predictive of moving to the right ideologically.  For the three groups of students, 55% of those 
who moved to the right, 48% of those who moved to the left, and 42% of those who remained 
stable were Christian.  This creates a statistically significant difference between moving to the 
right and remaining stable, so that Christian students were more likely to move to the right than 
to remain stable, but not more likely to move to the right than to move to the left.   
 Breaking this group down further, white Christians look different than Christians as a 
whole.  In terms of party identification, in wave one, 29.2% of white Christians identify as 
Democrat and 33.3% identify as Republican.  This is the first and only group we see with more 
students identifying as Republican than Democrat.  Furthermore, in wave one, 56.1% of these 
students fall to the left of the ideology scale.  While this is still a majority leaning to the left, this 
is the lowest that we have seen.  In wave two, 34.9% of white Christians identify as Democrat 
and 30.2% identify as Republican.  This group of students no longer has a plurality of individuals 
identifying as Republican.  As for ideology, 43.2% experience a change on the ideology scale 
with 44.5% moving to the right and 55.4% moving to the left.  This individual level change has a 
limited effect on the overall ideological leaning of these students though as 57.1% lean to the left 
in wave two, which is only a one percentage point increase from wave one.  White Christians are 
also different from Christians as a whole in that this identity is not predictive of ideological 
change or stability.  Of Christian students, white Christians make up 65% of those who move to 
the right, 72% of those who move to the left, and 71% of those who remain stable.  This trend 
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looks more like the overall trend of white students from the PEP.  Therefore, it is likely that their 
racial identity is more salient in their political ideology formation than their religious identity.  
 Among non-Christian religious students, 63.2% identified as Democrat in wave one and 
13.2% as Republican while 75.7% leaned to the left on the ideology scale.  Between wave one 
and two, 38.2% moved on the ideology scale, with 55.1% of these moving to the left and 44.8% 
of these moving to the right.  These changes make it so that in wave two, 64.4% of non-Christian 
students identified as Democrat and 11.4% as Republican while 77.3% were on the left on the 
ideology scale.  It is seen that non-Christians students come in as more liberal and leave as more 
liberal compared to Christian students, but experience less of a change due to their strong 
incoming views.  It is also the case the being non-Christian is not predictive of neither 
ideological change nor stability.  Among the three groups, 25% of those who moved to the right, 
24% of those who moved to the left, and 25% of those who remained stable were Non-Christian 
students.   
 Non-religious students follow somewhat of a different pattern than religious students.  
For party identification, 50.0% enter as a Democrat and 2.2% as a Republican and 51.7% leave 
as a Democrat and 3.9% as a Republican.  Many of these students either identify as independents 
or as not politically affiliated, just as they are not religiously affiliated.  However, on the 
ideology scale, in wave one 89.2% lean to the left and in wave two 89.8% lean to the left.  From 
this, it is clear that these non-religious students do have strong leftward leanings, yet they are not 
as inclined to sort themselves into corresponding political parties.  Furthermore, they see little 
overall change in their ideological leaning, which is unlike either religious grouping discussed or 
any other demographic group.  This stability of political ideology is actually predicted by their 
non-religious affiliation.  Of students who remain stable, 33% are non-affiliated, while 19% of 
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those who move to the right and 28% of those who move to the left are non-religious.  This 
produces a significant difference between moving to the right and remaining stable, where non-
affiliated students are more likely to remain stable than move to the right. 
Table 2.5: Religion and Political Party/Ideological Leaning 
 Wave 1: % 
Democrat 
Wave 2: % 
Democrat 
Wave 1: % 
Republican 
Wave 2: % 
Republican 
Wave 1: % 
Leaning to 
the Left 
Wave 2: % 
Leaning to 
the Left 
Christian 38.1% 44.9% 25.9% 22.6% 61.5% 63.1% 
White 
Christian 
29.2% 34.9% 33.3% 30.2% 56.1% 57.1% 
Non-
Christian 
63.2% 64.4% 13.2% 11.4% 75.7% 77.3% 
Non-
affiliated  
50.0% 51.7% 2.2% 3.9% 89.2% 89.9% 
 















Wave 1 Wave 2
Religion and Party Identification
Christian: Democrat Non-Christian Democrat Non-affiliated: Democrat




Table 2.6: One-Way ANOVA for Religion 
 
Parents’ Level of Education 
 The level of education that an individual’s parents’ have is important for multiple 
reasons.  First, a higher level of education is associated with greater political knowledge.  If a 
student has one or more parents with a college degree, then they are more likely to have been 
exposed to political topics before and already have formed some political beliefs.  Additionally, 
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 % % %   
Religion      
     Christian .55 .42 .48 3.09* N/A 
        White Christian .65 .71 .72 .416 N/A 
     Non-Christian .25 .25 .24 .042 N/A 
     Non-affiliated  .19 .33 .28 3.64* AB 
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college degree, then they are more likely to come from a high-income family.  With this being 
said, a student’s parents’ level of education could have an impact on their ability to go to college 
and their political views going into college.   
 Among students with both parents having attained a college degree, 52.5% are Democrats 
in wave one and 14.2% are Republicans.  Additionally, 78% fall to the left on the ideology scale.  
Among these students, 35.1% experience a change in ideology between wave one and wave two 
with 52.3% moving to the left and 47.6% moving to the right.  In wave two, 54.4% of these 
students identify as Democrat and 12.6% as Republican with 77.2% falling to the left on the 
ideology scale.  These students’ party identification and ideological leanings look similar in 
wave two to how they looked in wave one.  This indicates that their political beliefs and 
ideological leanings were formed before they arrived at college and that their experiences in 
college did little to change their views.  This idea is supported by the fact that the ANOVA 
analysis of PEP shows that having two college-educated parents is associated with ideological 
stability during college.  For the three groups, 53% of students who remained stable come from a 
family where both of their parents are college educated, while 48% of students who move to the 
right and 41% of students who move to the left have two college-educated parents.  It appears 
that the significant difference is between the stable group and the group who moved to the left, 
so that students with two college-educated parents are more likely to remain stable than move to 
the left.  This may be because this group of students came in very far to the left on the ideology 
scale, so that they can either remain stable or move to the right. 
 Students with neither parent having attained a college degree look different from this 
previous group of students.  In wave one, 43.4% of these students identify as Democrat and 
18.2% as Republican.  Furthermore, 67.6% lean to the left on the ideology scale.  Between the 
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waves, 44.8% of students experience a change in ideology leaning, with 51.5% moving to the 
left and 48.4% moving to the right.  At wave two, 50.7% identify as Democrat and 16.2% as 
Republican with 69.7% leaning to the left on the ideology scale.  These students, while they lean 
liberal, are not as liberal as students with two college educated parents during the first or second 
wave.  However, unlike the students with both parents having attained a college degree, more of 
these students experience a change in party identification and ideological leaning, indicating that 
their experiences in college have an impact on their political beliefs.  Despite the higher rate of 
change, having no parent with a college education is not predictive of ideological stability or 
change.  Of the three groups, 21% of those who remain stable, 30% of those who move to the 
right, and 24% of those who move to the left have no parent with a college education.  Due to the 
lack of significant difference between the three groups, having neither parent with a college 
education does not affect the student’s likelihood of ideological change during college. 
 Students with only one parent who graduated from college look more like students with 
neither parent having attained a college degree.  In wave one, 43.8% of these students identify as 
Democrat and 15.3% as Republican, with 70.4% leaning liberal.  These students fall in between 
the other two groups for the proportion that experienced a change in partisanship leaning, with 
42.8% moving on the partisanship scale.  However, unlike the previous groups of students, a 
higher percentage moved to the left with 66.1% of those who changed moving to the left and 
33.8% moving to the right.  In wave two, 46.2% of these students identified as Democrat and 
15.9% as Republican, with 74.8% leaning liberal.  In this way, the party identification of these 
students looks more like students with neither parent having attended college, and their score on 
the partisanship scale looking more like students whose parents both got a college degree.  It can 
be seen that attending college does have an impact on their political beliefs like it does for those 
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students whose parents did not attain a college degree.  However, the education background of 
their parents is not predictive of their ideological change during college.  Among the three 
groups of students, 22% of those who remain stable, 20% of those who move to the right, and 
30% of those who move to the left have only one parents with a college education.  Even though 
it appears that these students are overrepresented among those who move to the left, there is no 
statistically significant different between the groups.  Therefore, there may be another factor 
causing these students to shift in ideology. 
 As with the findings on gender, these findings on parents’ education level contrast with 
what might be expected from previous research.  On the one hand, a student’s parents’ education 
level is indicative of how much political information the student would have been exposed to 
growing up, where the more education one’s parents have, the more exposed to political 
information one is.  We would expect to see that students with both parent’s having a college 
degree would be more likely to remain ideologically stable, while students with neither parent 
having a college degree would be more likely to change ideologically.  However, while we see 
that students with two college educated parents are more likely to remain stable, we do not see 
that students with less than two college educated parents are more likely to experience a change 
in ideology.  Furthermore, my findings both support and go against what Greenstein argues in his 
study that high-socioeconomic children are more likely to be politically interested and involved 
(Greenstein 1969).  He argues that children of higher-status parents are more likely to internalize 
a sense of responsibility and more likely to plan for the future, which translates to being more 
politically interested and involved (Greenstein 1969).  Greenstein additionally finds that higher-
status children are more likely to ground their party preferences in information (Greenstein 
1969).  If having two college educated parents translates to a higher socioeconomic status and 
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having neither parent with a college education translates to a lower socioeconomic status, then 
we would again expect to see the first group as more likely to be stable during college and the 
second group to be more likely to change during college.  Yet, we only see that the first group is 
associated with stability while the second group is not associated with change nor stability.  
Therefore, socioeconomic status as measured through parents’ education level is only predictive 
of ideological stability or change during college to a certain extent.  
Table 2.7: Parent Education Level and Political Party/Ideological Leaning 
 Wave 1: % 
Democrat 
Wave 2: % 
Democrat 
Wave 1: % 
Republican 
Wave 2: % 
Republican 
Wave 1: % 
Leaning to 
the Left 
















































Wave 1 Wave 2
Parent Education Level and Party Identification
Both: Democrat One: Democrat Neither: Democrat







Wave 1 Wave 2
Parent Education Level and Ideology (% leaning to the left)
Both One Neither
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Table 2.8: One-Way ANOVA for Parent Education Level 
 
Overall Takeaways  
 With these basic demographic findings from the Political Engagement Project, three 
major patterns can be seen as to how college affects groups of students.  The first is that college 
has little effect on students with strong preexisting political beliefs.  This is seen with black 
students, female students, non-religious students, and students with both parents having attained 
a college degree.  For black and female students, their identity likely played a large role in 
shaping their political attitudes before they arrived at college. In the general public both blacks 
and women lean towards the Democratic party, so it is not surprising that college students from 
these groups follow the same pattern (Pew 2018).  For students whose parents are both college 
educated, they were likely to have been exposed to political issues and topics throughout their 
lifetime as education is associated with political knowledge and involvement.  Therefore, these 
students likely formed political opinions while they were growing up based on their family 
background.  Because these groups of students already have strong views entering college, there 
is little room for movement.  As for non-religious students, it is harder to tell what might have 
had an impact on their political party identification and ideology leanings before they entered 
college.  In fact, one might assume that because they do not have religion to influence their 
political view, they would be more susceptible to change, but this is not the case.  Despite this, it 
 Moved 
rightA  
(N = 105) 
StableB 
(N = 351)  
Moved 
leftC 




 % % %   
Parents’ Level of Education      
     Neither College-Educated .30 .21 .24 1.70 N/A 
     One College-Educated .20 .22 .30 2.30 N/A 
     Both College-Educated .48 .53 .41 3.08* N/A 
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is the case that among the general public, individuals with no religious affiliation strongly lean 
towards identifying as a Democrat (Pew 2018). 
 A second pattern that emerges is that college creates stronger liberal leanings in students.  
For many groups, a plurality of students enters identifying as Democrat or leaning to the left and 
end with more students identifying as Democrat and leaning more to the left.  This pattern is seen 
in white students, Hispanic students, Asian students, male students, non-Christian students, and 
students with one or neither parent having attained a college degree.  For some of these students, 
their identity is not as strongly tied to their political affiliations.  For example, in the general 
public, men and whites see a fairly even split between Republican and Democrat (Pew 2018).  
Because they are not necessarily predisposed to a party or ideological leaning, there is more of 
an opening for them to change.  As for Hispanic, Asian, and non-Christian students, their identity 
is often tied to a political leaning, as it is seen amongst the general public that these groups lean 
to the left (Pew 2018).  However, the data from the PEP show that these groups of students do 
become more liberal between wave one and wave two, suggesting that college had an impact on 
their party identification and ideology.  As for the students with one or neither parent having 
attained a college degree, they were likely not exposed to many political issues growing up, so 
their college experiences provided them with an opportunity to learn about these issues and form 
opinions about them. 
 A third pattern that is seen is a complete reversal in political leanings.  This is only seen 
in one group from the PEP: white Christians.  This process is the most difficult to achieve and 
least likely to be observed as once an individual has a party identification, it is unlikely to 
change.  However, among white Christians who participated in the PEP, it is observed that in 
wave one a plurality of students identifies as Republican and then in wave two a plurality of 
 54 
students identifies as Democrat.  This is somewhat surprising as among the general public, white 
Christians overwhelmingly identify as Republican (Pew 2018).  It can be concluded that college 
did have an impact in reversing the party leanings of this group.  Something else that is 
interesting about white Christians is that even though a large change is seen in party 
identification, a similar change is not observed in overall ideological leanings.  Therefore, for 
these college students their religious beliefs and college experiences may be pulling in two 
different directions and for some their experiences in college come to outweigh their religious 
predispositions.  Although this is the only group from the PEP that follows this pattern, it does 
not mean that they are the only group that does in the entire college population.  
 Furthermore, we see from the ANOVA analysis that demographic traits are both 
predictive of ideological stability and of ideological change.  This suggests that in some cases, 
certain pre-existing (pre-college) factors are more important to the formation of the political 
ideology of an individual than the experience of college is.  For female students, non-religiously 
affiliated students, and students with two college educated parents, their identity as a part of 
these groups or exposure to previous political information is predictive of ideological stability.  
For the first two of these groups, their identity has likely had a large part in forming their 
ideology, but this is certainly not the only process taking place.  For the last group, exposure to 
previous political knowledge from their college educated parents may have influenced their 
ideology.  On the other hand, a students’ identity may lend themselves to being more open to 
change during college.  For male students, Hispanic students, and Christian students, their 
demographic identity is predictive of ideological change during college.  For male and Christian 
students, it appears as though they are more apt to moving to the right than staying stable, which 
aligns with the idea of an ideological gender gap and Christians as being socially conservative.  
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For Hispanic students, they are more likely to move to the left than to remain ideologically 
stable, and there is likely something about their ethnicity or group experiences that makes them 
more open to change during college.  In the next section, I will explore what might also have an 
impact on changing a student’s political ideology, including aspects about the college 
experience. 
Analysis of Pre-college and College Factors 
Political Knowledge/Interest 
 The original purpose of the Political Engagement Project was to “study the effects of a 
number of promising educational approaches that were designed to support political 
development.”  The hope was that taking part in these programs and courses would increase the 
political knowledge and interest of these students.  This appears to have been the case as on 
average, students rate themselves as having more in-depth knowledge about political issues and 
following politics more often after the program/course.  These questions may also be instructive 
about why students may be likely to change their political views during college or remain stable 
in their political ideology.  In general, individuals who have more political interest and 
knowledge are more stable in their political views (Zaller 1992).  Because these people have the 
most exposure to political issues and different opinions, they are likely to have formed strong 
political opinions (Zaller 1992).  Therefore, even when faced with new political information, 
they will remain steady in their views (Zaller 1992).  If this is the case for the general public, 
then it can likely be observed on the college level as well. 
 What we find with the data from the PEP is that this holds true with certain variables.  
First, the students who remained stable more closely followed government and public affairs 
than students who moved to the left during wave one.  For wave one, students who remained 
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stable had a mean of 4.44 while students who moved to the left had a mean of 4.00 and students 
who moved to the right had a mean of 4.26.  There is a significant difference between the 
students who remained stable and the students who moved to the left, while students who moved 
to the right fall in between.  During wave two, students who remained stable had a mean of 4.61, 
students who moved to the left had a mean of 4.36, and students who moved to the right had a 
mean of 4.55.  By wave two, there is no significant difference between these three groups for 
how often each follows government and public affairs.  An explanation for this difference is that 
students who remained stable had more incoming exposure to political issues.  This means that 
their political views were stronger at the beginning and more likely to hold.  On the other hand, 
students who moved to the left followed politics the least, and therefore had the most to learn 
about politics during their time at college.  Therefore, they were more open to change from what 
they were about to experience at college.  The reason why the significant difference disappears 
by the second wave is because all of the students increased how often they follow politics due to 
the courses and programs they were taking with the PEP, so this was no longer predictive of 
ideological change.  However, it remains important that pre-college exposure to political affairs 
is predictive of ideological stability. 
 Another factor that is predictive of ideological stability from the PEP is how students rate 
their knowledge about current or international political issues.  Students who remained stable 
rated themselves as having more in-depth knowledge on this topic than students who moved to 
the left.  For this measure, during wave one, students who remained stable had a mean of 4.04, 
students who moved to the left had a mean of 3.67, and students who moved to the right had a 
mean of 3.88.  During wave two, students who remained stable had a mean of 4.28, students who 
moved to the left had a mean of 3.96, and students who moved to the right had a mean of 4.31.  
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In both waves, there was a significant difference between the students who remained stable and 
the students who moved to the left, but not with students who moved to the right.  (Even though 
students who moved to the right had a higher mean than students who remained stable, this did 
not create a significant difference with students who moved to the left because they had a higher 
standard deviation.)  As with the previous measure on following politics, students who claimed 
to have a more in-depth knowledge of national and international political issues were those 
students who remained stable.  If students have a better understanding of politics, then they are 
able to form stronger opinions which last and do not waiver.  Students who have lower levels of 
understanding of political issues will be more likely to change their political views and may draw 
insight from those around them at college. 
 The last variable measuring political interest/knowledge to have a significant difference 
between the three groups it how students rate their knowledge on theories about politics and 
democracy.  Again, students who remained stable rated themselves as having more in-depth 
knowledge on this topic.  Students who remained stable had a mean of 3.99, students who moved 
to the left had a mean of 3.72, and students who moved to the right had a mean of 3.67.  While 
the differences between the means does produce an F that is significant, there is no indication on 
which groups this is between.  Furthermore, in wave two, this significance disappears; students 
who remained stable had a mean of 4.26, students who moved to the left had a mean of 4.11, and 
students who moved to the right had a mean of 4.36.  Therefore, this measure does not appear to 
have a large effect on ideological change or stability despite having a significant F. 
 These measures indicate that previous political interest and knowledge should be 
predictive of ideological stability in college students.  However, if this was the case, we would 
see the same pattern for all measures of political interest and knowledge with the different 
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variables from the PEP.  Yet, there are variables asking about political interest and knowledge 
that do not have a significant difference between any of the groups for either wave one or wave 
two, such as knowledge about local or state politics or knowledge about economic issues.  
Therefore, there must be something special about the political knowledge that students get from 
following government and public affairs or from understanding current national or international 
political issues which causes students to remain ideologically stable rather than move to the left.  
Connected to this idea of political interest and knowledge is a student’s previous exposure to 
political issues, which I look at next. 
Table 2.9: One-Way ANOVA for Political Interest/Knowledge (Wave 1 and Wave 2) 
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Previous Political Exposure  
 Some possible sources of students’ incoming political knowledge and interest might be 
from their experiences during high school or at home, and these can also have an effect on 
whether or not a student experiences a change in ideology during college.  High schools as a 
place of learning could be responsible for teaching students about political issues which increase 
their political knowledge.  Unfortunately, the PEP only asked one question about exposure to 
political topics in high school, so we are not able to have a full understanding from this.  This 
question asks how often political topics were discussed in high school, ranging from never to 
very often.  Students who remained stable had a mean of 4.08, students who moved to the left 
had a mean of 3.87, and students who moved to the right had a mean of 3.75.  As would be 
expected, students who remained stable reported discussing politics in high school at a higher 
rate than either group of students who changed ideology during college.  However, this 
difference is not at a significant level, and so no conclusions can be realistically drawn from this. 
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 Another place where incoming college students may have been previously exposed to 
political issues is at home.  Again, the variables from the PEP are not comprehensive on this 
topic, so we cannot get a full understanding on the effects of this and how it may affect the 
changing or stable political ideology of college students.  However, it is worth investigating 
because parent socialization and party identification can be predictive of a child’s political views.  
One measure that could indicate political exposure at home is whether or not one’s parents 
received the newspaper.  The newspaper could be a source of political knowledge for the parents 
who then discussed the topics, or a direct source for the kids who might also read the newspaper.  
Therefore, it might be the case that one’s parents receiving the newspaper is predictive of 
ideological stability since they were exposed to political topics from a young age.  Despite these 
assumptions, there is no significant difference between the students who remained stable, the 
students who moved to the left, and the students who moved to the right for how often their 
parents received the newspaper. 
 Another parent measure that could affect an individual’s political knowledge and thus 
stability of ideology is how often the parents voted in elections.  The more often one’s parents 
voted, the more likely that their parents were politically knowledgeable and involved.  The less 
often one’s parents voted, the less likely that their parents were politically knowledgeable and 
involved.  This could be used as a proxy measure for how much an individual was exposed to 
political issues growing.  If this is the case, we would expect to see the stable students’ parents 
voting at a higher rate than the parents of the students who had a change in ideology.  However, 
like the previous measure, there is no significant difference between the three groups, so parent’s 
voting is not predictive of a student’s change in ideology.  Despite these null findings, this does 
not mean that political exposure from previous education or parents has no effect, only that these 
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measures that the PEP took had no significant effect on the difference between the three groups.  
Next, I will examine how an individual’s identity may affect their likelihood of ideological 
change or stability. 
Table 2.10: One-Way ANOVA for Previous Political Exposure 
 
Personal Identity 
 Previous research on political attitudes has tried to connect these attitudes to specific 
personality characteristics that individuals possess.  One common measurement of personality is 
the five-factor model; this model argues that an individual’s personality is the sum of 5 traits: 
openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism.  John Jost argues that 
two of these traits are especially important and connected to political beliefs.  He reasons that a 
high level of openness is connected to political liberalism and supporting change and 
egalitarianism.  On the other hand, conscientiousness is related to political conservatism and 
wanting to maintain the status quo.  Based off of these principles, it would be easy to assume that 
these traits can also be related to the direction that students move in college with more open 
students moving to the left and more conscientious students moving to the right. 
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 The Political Engagement Project does ask about each student’s personal identity during 
both wave one and wave two.  While the questions asked do not entirely line up with the traits 
that are a part of the five-factor model, some variables do lend themselves towards these traits.  
However, the findings from the analysis do not line up with ideas on the connection between 
these traits and ideological change based on Jost’s findings.  First off, there are many null 
findings where a personality trait does not relate to a change or lack of change in ideology in 
either the first or second wave.  For example, related to the idea of conscientiousness is that of 
being fair or unbiased.  With this question from the PEP, one might assume that those who move 
to the right would rate fairness as being more central to their sense of self.  However, there is no 
statistically significant difference in how students who move to the right rate themselves and the 
other two groups of students.  Furthermore, a measure of being unconventional or non-
conformist can be related to the idea of openness as a personality trait.  If the five-factor model 
had any relation to predicting how students change their ideology during college, we would 
expect to see students who move to the left rating being unconventional as more central to 
themselves.  However, again we do not see the expected results.  Students who move to the left 
rate this trait as being central to their sense of selves at a similar level to those students who 
moved to the right and students who remained stable in both wave one and wave two. 
 There are two places where we find a statistically significant difference between two 
groups with the personality trait variables.  First, in wave one there is a significant difference in 
how students who remained stable and students who moved to the left rated being concerned 
about justice and human rights as a part of their sense of self.  Students who moved to the left 
had a median rating of 4.68 while students who remained stable had a median rating of 4.97.  
Students who moved to the right fell in the middle with a median of 4.70.  What is interesting 
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about this finding is that students who remained stable rated this trait as more central to their 
sense of self than students who moved to the left.  One might assume that being concerned about 
justice and human rights is a trait we would associate with being politically liberal or falling to 
the left on an ideology scale.  However, here we see that it is associated with students who 
remain stable.  It is important to keep in mind that students who move to the left are not the same 
as people who fall to the left, that students who move to the right are not the same as people who 
fall to the right, and students who remain stable are not the same as individuals who fall 
ideologically in the middle.  Therefore, personality traits may not affect a change in ideology as 
much as they affect an individual’s ideology. 
 Another place where we see a significant difference is with how students who move to 
the right and students who remain stable rate themselves as being compassionate and concerned 
about all.  During wave two, students who remain stable have a median rating of 5.15 for this 
trait while students who move to the right have a median rating of 4.79 for this trait.  Students 
who move to the left fall in between with a median rating of 5.02.  What is important for this 
situation is that the statistical difference only appears in wave two, not wave one.  What creates 
this difference is that students who move to the right rate themselves lower on this trait in wave 
two and students who remain stable rate themselves as higher.  This wave difference is also key 
in the last variable as there is only a significant difference in wave one, not wave two.  Because 
neither of these traits remain important in explaining the difference between any groups, it seems 
unlikely that personality traits are predictive of ideological change in college.  Finally, in this 
vain of non-college influences, I will look at how exposure to the news media affect students’ 
ideological change and stability. 
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Table 2.11: One-Way ANOVA for Personal Identity (Wave 1 and Wave 2) 
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 The media, specifically the news media, can influence an individual’s political attitudes 
in multiple ways.  First, the news media can be a source of political knowledge for many 
individuals, as it can be where people obtain information about current events.  On the other 
hand, some media sources can play into partisan divisions.  While it is not the case that certain 
news media outlets have the effect of switching an individual’s ideology, these outlets may serve 
to reinforce an individual’s pre-existing beliefs and ideologies.  Between these two procedures, it 
is worth investigating whether or not media exposure can influence an individuals’ change in 
ideology during college. 
 The Political Engagement Project asks students about their typical weekly exposure to 
different types and sources of news media both in wave one and in wave two.  For the analysis, I 
draw on the data from wave two as this will be the data that contains a student’s media exposure 
during college.  From the analysis, there emerges two patterns of differences between the three 
groups of students.  The first difference is the difference between students who move to the right 
and students who move to the left.  Students who move to the right read magazines and watch 
national news on television more times in a given week than students who move to the left.  For 
reading magazines, students who move to the right report a median of 3.32, students who move 
to the left report a median of 2.70, and students who remain stable report a median of 2.83.  For 
watching national news, students who move to the right report a median of 4.94, students who 
move to the left report a median of 4.11 and students who remain stable report a median of 4.29.  
For each of these, there is a statistically significant difference between the students who move to 
the right and the students who move to the left.  Furthermore, students who move to the right 
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report reading about public affairs and politics in the newspaper at a higher rate than students 
who move to the left, although the difference borders on statistical significance. 
 Another pattern is between students who move to the right and students who remain 
stable.  Students who move to the right watch local news on television more frequently than 
students who remain stable, with a median of 4.74 and 4.04 respectively.  Students who move to 
the left fall in the middle with a median of 4.11.  For the other two measures of media exposure 
(radio and internet) students who move to the right report a higher exposure to these outlets than 
students who remain stable or students who move to the left, but not at a statistically significant 
rate.  Overall, it is clear from the data that students who move to the right have a higher self-
reported exposure to all sources of news.   
 To make sense of this, it is important to frame this trend in terms of the types of 
influences that news media exposure can have on an individual.  If the news media was purely a 
source of political information and knowledge, then we would have likely seen that students who 
remain stable have the highest exposure to the news media.  This would coincide with John 
Zaller’s principle that the individuals with the highest political knowledge (and therefore the 
least likelihood of changing ideology) have the highest exposure to political information.  
However, we do not see this as students who remain stable are exposed to the news media during 
the week at lower rates than students who move to the right.  Another possibility is that students 
who move to the right are obtaining their news from ideological outlets, specifically conservative 
media outlets.  While this may be true for some students, it cannot be true for all students as 
some students who move to the right still fall on the left end of the spectrum and would not 
choose to watch conservative news media. What could be the case is that the information 
students are getting from media outlets are different from the types of information that students 
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get from classwork activities which are associated with students moving to the left (discussed 
below).  This media influence could also work counter to the college campus culture, as in 
general college has the effect of moving more students to the left than to the right.  Now that I 
have covered non-college factors from the survey, I will now to turn college factors and 
experiences and how they affect political ideology. 
Table 2.12: One-Way ANOVA for Media Influence 
 
Peer Socialization 
 Based off of the work done by Weidman and Newcomb, it would be expected that 
socialization plays a role in changing the political views of college students.  This would mean 
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that students who experience a change in ideological leanings would have a higher rate of 
interaction with their peers than those who stayed stable in their ideology.  Analysis from the 
Political Engagement Project does not show this.  Rather, the ANOVA test shows that students 
who have a stable ideology have a rate of higher interaction with their peers at a statistically 
significant level than students who moved left.  The mean frequency for students who stayed 
stable was 5.14 while the mean frequency for students who moved to the left is 4.59.  This 
finding does not support the idea that socialization causes students to change their views.  
Alternatively, it points to the idea that students will surround themselves with like-minded 
individuals who reinforce their preexisting political views and ideology.  However, a statistically 
significant difference is not seen between students who remained stable and students who moved 
to the right.  Students who moved to the right had a mean frequency of interaction with their 
peers of 4.99, which is higher than those who moved to the left but lower than those who move 
to the right, but not at a significant level.  This complicates the idea that students who remain 
stable are unique and remain stable due to their high frequency of interaction with peers. 
 Another piece of evidence from the PEP that counters the socialization theory about 
ideological change in college students is that there is no significant difference between the three 
groups for the frequency of discussion about political events or public affairs with others.  
Students who remain stable have a mean frequency of 4.79 for discussion of current political 
events and 5.57 for discussion of political affairs.  Students who move to the right have a mean 
frequency of 4.76 for discussion of current political events and 5.39 for discussion of political 
affairs.  Students who moved to the left had a mean frequency of 4.59 for discussion of current 
political events and 5.15 for discussion of public affairs.  Because these differences are 
statistically insignificant, it shows that the frequency of socialization of each group is not that 
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much different from the other, pointing away from the idea that socialization is a force in moving 
students to the left.  Rather, it may be the case that students who remain stable have higher rates 
of political knowledge, so they are more likely to discuss political issues with others. 
 Teetering on the level of statistical significance is the variable “frequency of discussion 
of current political events with people who hold different views.”  Students who moved to the 
right had a mean frequency of interaction of 4.48 while students who moved to the left had a 
mean interaction of frequency of interaction of 4.06.  This difference indicates that students who 
move to the right have slightly more interaction with those who have different political views 
than those who move to the left, but not students who remain stable.  Unfortunately, data 
collected for the PEP do not contain information about the political ideology of the people whom 
the students interacted with, so it is difficult to draw conclusions about how these other 
individuals may have affected the students.  Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that the 
students who moved to the right do not all fall to the right on the political spectrum.  These 
students all have different political views; their similarity is that they moved to the right during 
the time of this project, so different processes may be involved for different students.  For 
example, assuming that the political climate of college campuses is liberal leaning, students who 
started out on the right and moved further to the right might have done so in opposition to the 
students they were interacting with that they perceived as too far to the left.  Another possibility 
is that students who started out all the way to the left had no other direction to move but to the 
right interacted with a campus culture that was liberal but not as far to the left as these students.  
These students may be pulled more towards the ideological center, thus moving to the right.  
Overall, it does not seem like socialization through interaction and conversations with peers has 
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a large effect on changing or stabilizing students’ political ideologies.  Next, I will examine how 
the academic experiences of these students and how they are tied to ideological change. 
Table 2.13: One-Way ANOVA for Peer Socialization 
 
Academics  
 Because the Political Engagement Project was centered around certain types of courses or 
academic programs, there are a lot of variables asking about the students’ experiences with these 
programs.  A few findings emerge from looking at these variables and seeing how different 
aspects about the class or program contributed to the students’ learning.  First, students who 
moved to the right found research projects to be less important to their learning for the program 
than students who remained stable or students who moved to the left.  For this variable, students 
who moved to the right had a mean of 3.35, students who remained stable had a mean of 3.93, 
and students who moved to the left had a mean of 4.11.  There is statistically significant 
difference between the means of the students who moved to the right and the students who 
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remained stable as well as between the students who moved to the right and the students who 
moved to the left.  This indicates that students who moved to the right did not learn as much 
from the research papers they had to write as a part of the PEP, while students who remained 
stable or moved to the left learned more from these research papers either reaffirming the 
existing beliefs or moving them to the left. 
 Two other variables appear to have played an important role in moving students to the 
left.  The first is having opportunities to influence the course content and organization.  Students 
who moved to the left found this aspect as being important to their learning with a mean of 3.87, 
while students who remained stable had a mean of 3.07 which is significantly less.  This 
indicates that these opportunities had a role in moving student’s ideologies to the left.  
Furthermore, political simulations as a part of the course or program also made a difference in a 
student’s ideology.  Students who moved to the left found this aspect important to their learning 
with a mean of 2.14 while students who stayed stable had a mean of 1.57.  Again, this difference 
is statistically significant, indicating that these political simulations helped drive students’ 
ideology to the left.  With both variables, the means of students who moved to the right fall in 
between the students who remained stable and the students who moved to the left.  There is no 
statistically significant difference between the means, but it indicates that these experiences were 
more important to those students who had a change in ideology than those who remained stable, 
especially for those students who moved to the left.  This points to class related learning 
experiences as having an effect on changing students’ ideology and producing college graduates 
who as a whole lean to the left. 
 Specifically, these independent, self-driven learning experiences seem important to 
moving students to the left, and not learning experiences that are influenced by professors.  
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According to many conservative critics of higher education, liberal professors are imposing their 
ideology on students, causing the students to become more liberal.  If this were the case, we 
would expect to find professor-led learning experiences to be important to the students’ learning 
and predictive of moving to the left, but this is not the case.  Professor assigned readings, 
lectures, and even classroom discussions do not produce a significant difference in the means of 
the different groups of students when they rated the importance of each of these aspects to their 
learning.  Because each group of students rated these experiences to have about the same level of 
importance to their learning, it does not appear that these professor-driven experiences play a 
role in changing students’ ideology.  Even when these courses or any other course required that 
students keep up with politics or discus politics in class, the experiences between the three 
groups of students does not statistically differ.  Therefore, it does not seem like professors are 
indoctrinating their students with liberal values; rather, when students do move to the left, it is 
because of the work that the students do for the class. Tied to specific academic experiences is 
the academic major of students, which I turn to next. 
Table 2.14: One-Way ANOVA for Academics 
 Moved 
rightA  
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StableB 
(N = 351)  
Moved 
leftC 
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 Another aspect about college that previous scholars claim to affect a student’s ideology is 
their academic major.  Results from the Political Engagement Project show that this is not the 
case.  The only major that creates a finding which boarders on statistical significance is political 
science/public policy/government.  From the PEP, political science majors make up 29% of 
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students who remained stable in their ideology, 23% of students who moved to the right, and 
19% of students who moved to the left.  The important difference in this case would be between 
those students who moved to the left and those students who stayed stable; however, the 
difference does not reach statistical significance.  Other majors which one might suspect to move 
students to the left, such as other social sciences or arts & humanities, or to the right, such as 
business/marketing, do not do so.  Even majors which are not political or ideological in nature 
and one might predict to be associated with a stable ideology, such as STEM majors, are not 
associated with stable political ideologies.  Therefore, a student’s academic major does not 
appear to have an influence on their political ideology.  Next, I will turn to extracurricular 
activities that students are a part of during their time in college and how these activities may 
affect political ideology. 
Table 2.15: One-Way ANOVA for Academic Major 
 
Extracurricular Activities 
 While at college, students are not only involved in academics but also extracurricular 
activities.  Participation in different extracurricular activities have the possibility to affect a 
student’s political ideology through interaction with other members or through activities done as 
 Moved 
rightA  
(N = 105) 
StableB 
(N = 351)  
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leftC 














     Political Science/Public 
Policy/Government 




     Other Social Science .43 .41 .46 .471 N/A 
     Business/Marketing .05 .03 .06 .792 NA 
     Arts & Humanities .05 .07 .09 .800 N/A 
     STEM  .20 .14 .15 .997 N/A 
    Other/Undecided .05 .05 .05 .016 N/A 
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a part of an organization or group.  For example, one might think that volunteering for a religious 
group might pull a student to the right or volunteering for an environmental organization might 
pull a student to the left.  However, the data show that this is not the case.  While students who 
moved to the right did have a higher mean frequency for volunteering for a religious group, there 
is not a statistically significant difference between any of the three groups.  Furthermore, there is 
no statistically significant difference between the three groups as to their mean frequency of 
volunteering for an environmental organization.   
 Where there is a statistically significant difference is in belonging to a civic/community 
group and belonging to an arts/music group.  In both cases, students who remained stable are 
more likely to belong to these types of organizations than students who moved to the right.  With 
membership to a civic or community group, 70% of students who stayed stable said they did 
previously or currently and 51% of students who moved to the right said they did previously or 
currently.  Students who moved to the left fell in the middle at 60%, but this did not create a 
statistically significant difference with the two other groups.  As for past or current membership 
with a performing arts or music group, 57% of students who remained stable claimed 
membership and 43% of students who moved to the right claimed membership.  Again, students 
who moved to the left fell in between at 52%.  A possible reason for why students who remained 
stable were more likely to participate in these types of organizations is because they knew what 
they wanted to do going into college and were able to find organizations which would help them 
stick to their convictions.  For example, arts students are typically considered to be more liberal, 
so by joining an arts group and surrounding themselves with likeminded students, their pre-
existing ideologies will be reinforced.  This process may not be entirely a conscious choice, but 
rather people are attracted to those who are similar to them. 
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 However, if it was the case that students joined organizations and extracurricular 
activities to reinforce their existing ideologies, there would be more indications of this from the 
data from other organizations; yet this is not the case.  For all other extracurricular activities and 
organizations the Political Engagement Project asked about, students who remained stable were 
not significantly more likely to have participated than students who moved left or right.  
Therefore, students are not necessarily selecting into organizations based on a desire to reinforce 
their ideology.  This indicates that there may be something special about civic or arts groups 
which causes student to remain stable in their ideology.  Finally, I turn to the living environment 
of students during college and how this may change a student’s ideology.  
Table 2.16: One-Way ANOVA for Extracurricular Activities  
 Moved 
rightA  
(N = 105) 
StableB 
(N = 351)  
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education in the past four years 
(1=never; 6= very often) 
     Do you, or have you in the 
past, belong to a performing 
arts/music group on campus or in 
the community  
.43 .57 .52 3.53* AB 
     Do you, or have you in the 
past, belong to an environmental 
group on campus or in the 
community  
.28 .38 .33 1.63 N/A 
     Do you, or have you in the 
past, belong to a religious group 
on campus or in the community  
.50 .58 .59 1.10 N/A 
     Do you, or have you in the 
past, belong to an organized 
sports group on campus or in the 
community  
.71 .67 .69 .293 N/A 
     Do you, or have you in the 
past, belong to a student 
government group on campus or 
in the community  
.46 .53 .46 1.15 N/A 
     Do you, or have you in the 
past, belong to a student 
publications group on campus or 
in the community  
.42 .44 .43 .081 N/A 
     Do you, or have you in the 
past, belong to a subject-oriented 
group on campus or in the 
community  
.58 .55 .61 .646 N/A 
     Do you, or have you in the 
past, belong to a civic or 
community group on campus or 
in the community 
.51 .70 .60 6.79*** AB 
     Do you, or have you in the 
past, belong to an ethnic or 
racially affiliated group on 
campus or in the community  
.35 .30 .33 .456 N/A 
     Do you, or have you in the 
past, belong to a political group 
or candidates running for office 
on campus or in the community  
.34 .40 .36 .735 N/A 
     Do you, or have you in the 
past, belong to a college-level 
honor society on campus or in the 
community  
.44 .38 .41 .557 N/A 
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Living Environment in College 
When students are not in class or partaking in an extracurricular activity, they are likely 
in their room.  Where a student lives while in college is important in determining who a student 
interacts with and spends a significant amount of time with.  This social interaction with others 
has the possibility of influencing a student’s ideology just as going to class or talking to their 
friends does.  The most common form of housing in college is to live in a college dorm or in 
campus housing.  In this situation, students are surrounded by other students.  Depending on the 
university, students will be surrounded by their fellow classmates or by students from other 
classes.  With campus housing, 50% of students who remained stable lived in campus housing, 
45% of students who moved to the left lived in campus housing, and 40% of students who 
moved to the right lived in campus housing.  Despite these differences in proportions, there is not 
a statistically significant difference between the groups.  Therefore, it does not look like living in 
campus housing has an effect on ideology. 
Some schools offer housing for students in a certain program so that these students can 
live together.  If students spend time with these other students both in the classroom and where 
they live, this will increase the amount of interaction that students have with these specific 
individuals and increase the possibility of socialization to change ideology.  However, again 
there is not a statistically significant difference between the three groups of students; 12% of 
students who remained stable, 11% of students who moved to the left, and 10% of students who 
moved to the right lived in this type of housing.  
In their article, Routon and Walker show that students who are a part of a Greek 
organization on campus do experience a change in political ideology.  While being a part of a 
Greek organization can be considered an extracurricular activity, it also can determine where a 
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student lives during college.  Because being a part of a Greek organization is shown to change 
students’ views on certain political issues, it can be expected that living with a fraternity or 
sorority will change a student’s political ideology.  However, data from the Political Engagement 
Project do not show that this is the case.  Among students who remained stable, 5% lived in a 
fraternity or sorority while 7% of students who moved to the left and 5% of students who moved 
to the right lived in a fraternity or sorority.  These findings do not mean that what Routon and 
Walker found were wrong, but that the process of changing the political views of Greek 
organization members is more complex.  While Routon and Walker find that these students come 
to have more similar views, they may start in different places so that some are moving to the 
right while others are moving to the left while others are remaining stable.  Furthermore, they 
find that these students change their views on key issues; while this may be the case, students 
may not perceive that these changes have changed their overall ideology, so they do not report a 
change in their ideology. 
While living on campus does not appear to have an effect on students’ ideology, living 
off campus could produce a different result.  One option is that students live within walking 
distance of campus; 21% of students who remained stable, 19% of students who moved to the 
left, and 16% of students who moved to the right did this.  There is no statistically significant 
difference between these three groups.  Another option is to live within driving distance; 13% of 
students who remained stable, 15% of students who moved to the left, and 7% of students who 
moved to the right did this.  These differences are also not statistically significant.  These null 
findings indicate that living off-campus, presumably with peers, does not have an effect on a 
student’s political ideology.   
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The one living situation that does seem to be associated with a change in ideology is 
living with one’s parents or relatives.  Among students who moved to the right, 38% lived with 
their parents or other relatives, while only 26% of students who remained stable and 21% of 
students who moved to the left lived with their parents or relatives.  These data produce a 
significant difference between both the students who moved to the right and the students who 
moved to the left and the students who moved to the right and the students who remained stable.  
One reason for this finding is that living with one’s parents or relatives moves them to the right.  
The parents of college students may be more conservative than their children, so by living with 
their parents these students may come to adopt more similar views to their parents.  However, it 
would not make sense if parent driven socialization and change was the only process occurring 
in this situation.  If parents influence their children’s political ideology, then this process would 
have likely occurred in the 18 years the child was living with their parents before they started 
attending college.  By the time the child reached college age, living with their parents during 
college would likely cause their political ideology to remain stable, not move to the right.  
Another explanation for this finding is that students who live with their parents are missing out 
on college experiences which cause students to move to the left or reinforce their incoming 
ideologies.  Therefore, while other living conditions are associated with all three groups at a 
roughly equal rate, living at home overwhelmingly produces students who move right.  This may 
indicate that there is something about living on campus with other college students and being 
surrounded by the campus culture which increases the likelihood that students stay stable or 
move to the left. 
Table 2.18: One-Way ANOVA for College Living Environment 
 Moved 
rightA  
(N = 105) 
StableB 
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leftC 







 To start off, there are different college and non-college factors which cause students to 
move to the left, move to the right, or remain stable.  Students who move to the left are more 
likely to be Hispanic and rate opportunities to influence the course content, political simulations, 
and research papers or projects as more important to their learning experiences while in college.  
Students who move to the right are more likely to be male, live with their parents or relatives 
while in college, and consume different types of media such as magazines, national news on 
television, and local news on television.  Students who remained stable are more likely to be 
female, non-religiously affiliated, have both parents be college educated, rate themselves as 
having higher political knowledge about government and public affairs and national and 
international political issues, see themselves as compassionate, belong to a civic or community 
group, belong to a performing arts group, rate research papers as promoting to their learning, and 
interact with their peers at a higher frequency.  From these lists it appears that there are more 
factors influencing college students to remain stable in political ideology than to change their 
political ideology.  On top of this, the majority of students from the PEP have a stable political 











     With parents/other relatives .38 .26 .21 4.88** AB; AC 
     Other students in 
course/program 
.10 .12 .11 .096 N/A 
     Dorm/campus housing .40 .50 .45 1.88 N/A 
     Fraternity or sorority .05 .05 .07 .467 N/A 
     Other residence within 
walking/biking distance from 
campus 
.16 .21 .19 .579 N/A 
     Other residence within driving 
distance from campus 
.07 .13 .15 2.04 N/A 
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experience a change in ideology.  Therefore, these findings indicate that going to college does 
not put college students at risk of being indoctrinated by liberal college academia. 
 However, it remains the case that the PEP population ends up as more liberal than it 
started.  Of the students who did experience a change in ideology, a majority moved to the left.  
In wave 1, 48% of the students identified as Democrats while in wave 2, 51.7% identified as 
Democrats.  In wave 1, 73.2% of the population fell to the left ideologically while in wave 2, 
74.1% fell to the left.  Importantly, the percentage of students identifying as extremely liberal 
increased from 11.7% to 14.6%.  So, while these college students do come in overwhelmingly 
leaning to the left, they end up leaning even more to the left.  This is why it is important to 
determine which factors are predictive of ideological change.  Even though a majority of 
students do not change, there is a sizable subset of the population that does change during 
college, and this has had some impact on the educational divide in America. 
 The findings from this project contrast with what previous literature has said on this 
topic, fitting with some previous findings, but not entirely.  First of all, there is no evidence that 
students are being indoctrinated by liberal professors.  While the results from this study do 
uphold critics’ main claim against colleges, that students are liberalized while at college, it is not 
to the same degree as they claim, nor is there much influence coming from professors (Sachs 
2020).  A large reason why this theory does not hold up is because students come to college with 
already formed political opinions.  Incoming college students are not blank slates to be molded 
by their professors; they have their own experiences which have affected their political view and 
ideology.  Even if some of these experiences do come in college and have a liberalizing effect, 
that does not make them any less legitimate than other factors which influence political beliefs. 
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 Next, some findings from this project uphold the self-selection hypothesis.  Braungart 
argues that family politics and social class are strong predictors of students’ politics, and this 
seems to be the case from the PEP.  Students with two college educated parents, which is an 
indication of high socioeconomic status, are more likely to have stable political views.  Their 
ideological stability during college indicates that their political views were shaped before coming 
to college, specifically by their family socioeconomic status.  Furthermore, it seems that students 
who rate themselves higher on certain aspects of political knowledge are more likely to remain 
stable during college.  This fits with Zaller’s model that those with the most political knowledge 
also have the most political exposure, in this case likely from their parents, and therefore have 
the most stable political views.  Students with high political exposure, likely ideologically liberal 
political exposure for college students, may be more likely to attend college, and remain 
ideologically stable during college.  However, other factors which would fit Braungart’s 
argument are not associated with ideological stability in the PEP, meaning that certain things we 
would expect to influence the self-selection process are not at play.  Furthermore, it remains the 
case that a large minority of college students do experience an ideological change in college, and 
a majority of these students move to the left. 
 The question then remains, what is causing these students to change their ideology during 
college and move to the left?  Newcomb, Dey, Milem, and Routon and Walker would argue that 
socialization is causing students to move to the left while in college.  Specifically, they argue that 
peer socialization plays in important role.  However, I find that this is not the case.  Students who 
interact most with their peers are actually more likely to remain stable than to move to the left.  
Even discussions of political events with peers has no effect on whether or not a student will 
experience a change in ideology.  Furthermore, the added peer interaction from living on campus 
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or in Greek Life housing does not affect a change in ideology.  What does affect a change in 
ideology is living with one’s parents, and these students are more likely to move to the right.  
This may indicate that students living with their parents are missing out on certain experiences 
and aspects of living with other college students which would cause their political ideology to 
remain stable or move to the left.  What my findings indicate is that political socialization during 
college may be a thing of the past.  While studies from 50 years ago do show the importance of 
socialization on ideology during college, I do not find these same results.  This may be because 
people are socialized and politicized at an earlier age now so that college socialization no longer 
has a large influence like it used to. 
While social learning from peers does not appear to be as important as in the past, 
another type of learning does seem to be pushing students to the left.  What does seem to move 
students from the PEP to the left is their classroom experiences.  Specifically, moving to the left 
is associated with hands-on learning opportunities, such as research papers, political simulations, 
and opportunities to influence the course content.  There must be something about the research 
that students do for these assignments and opportunities which exposes them to more liberal 
ideas or which causes them to rethink and reshape their preexisting beliefs.  However, it is 
important to keep in mind that the experiences are not shared by all college students, and that 
they may be unique to students in the PEP. 
Limitations 
First and foremost, a limitation of this project stems from the participants in the dataset.  
Respondents to the survey all took place in the PEP which meant they took courses specifically 
geared towards political issues.  Therefore, these students may be more politically minded or 
have a higher exposure to political issues than the average college student.  This could affect 
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how students shape their political ideology, as students learning about politics will think more 
about political issues and their own beliefs than other students.  Students learning about politics 
may also already have strong political views, making it so that this dataset underrepresents the 
amount of students who change their ideology during college.  What would solve this issue is a 
dataset that takes a truly random sample of college students and asks them about their political 
beliefs and college experiences. 
Furthermore, this data set only covers two years of the students’ time in college.  To 
better understand the full effect of college on students’ political views, it would help to have a 
survey which covers all four years.  What would be even better would be to conduct follow up 
surveys after the students graduate from college to see if the views they held in college remained 
stable once they graduated.  However, because panel data sets are hard to come by and hard to 
produce, a data set with these characteristics is hard to obtain.  Additionally, because of the 
sample size, I could only break the group of students down into three broad groups.  There were 
not enough students at the fringes to look at what was influencing these students to make drastic 
changes in their ideology.  Therefore, while there may be something interesting going on which 
causes students to flip their political leanings, this cannot be measured as not enough students 
experience this. 
7. Conclusion 
As stated above, going to college does not have the effect of flipping college students 
from conservative to liberal.  However, the fact remains that getting a college degree is 
associated with political liberalism and being a member of the Democratic party.  This is because 
while many students do not change their ideology during college, those who do are more likely 
to move to the left than to the right, showing that college has a mildly liberalizing effect on 
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students.  The process through which this happens appears to fit best with Astin’s input-
environment-output model.  Student’s ideological leanings influence whether or not they go to 
college and where they go to college.  Today, students with high socioeconomic status who can 
afford a college education and value a college education are more likely to go to college so that 
incoming college students are more liberal than college students in the past or those not going to 
college.  The creation of an individual’s political ideology begins early in life, when they are 
young and live with their parents.  However, political learning and socialization does not end 
there, but carries on into early adulthood, when people choose whether or not to go to college.  
Once in school, the college environment does have some effect on some college students, 
causing the body as a whole to be more liberal than when they started.  Therefore, neither the 
selection effect theory nor political socialization completely explain what is going on here.  
Neither theory is able to adequately explain why some students remain ideologically stable while 
others experience a change in ideology.  What I have been able to do is weave together the two 
theories to create a more comprehensive picture about college students’ experiences, both in 











Anon. 2012. “Colleges Viewed Positively, But Conservatives Express Doubts.” Pew Research 
Center for the People and the Press. Retrieved September 25, 2019 (https://www.people-
press.org/2012/03/01/colleges-viewed-positively-but-conservatives-express-doubts/). 
Anon. 2018. “Wide Gender Gap, Growing Educational Divide in Voters’ Party Identification.” 
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. Retrieved September 25, 2019 
(https://www.people-press.org/2018/03/20/wide-gender-gap-growing-educational-divide-
in-voters-party-identification/). 
Anon. n.d. “Astin’s I-E-O Model | Student Affairs Assessment Team.” Retrieved October 29, 
2019a (https://uwm.edu/saassessment/assessment-cycle-reports/ieo-model/). 
Anon. n.d. “Digest of Education Statistics, 2019.” National Center for Education Statistics. 
Retrieved March 24, 2020b 
(https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d19/tables/dt19_306.10.asp?current=yes). 
Braungart, Richard. 1971. “Family Status, Socialization, and Student Politics: A Multivariate 
Analysis.” American Journal of Sociology 77(1):108–30. 
Brint, Steven. 1985. “The Political Attitudes of Professionals.” Annual Review of Sociology 
11(1):389–414. 
Bryant, Alyssa. 2003. “Changes in Attitudes Toward Women’s Roles: Predicting Gender-Role 
Traditionalism Among College Students.” Sex Roles 48(3/4):131–42. 
Campbell, Colin, and Jonathan Horowitz. 2016. “Does College Influence Sociopolitical 
Attitudes?” Sociology of Education 89(1):40–58. 
Dailey, Ann. 1983. “Educational Attainment and Political Attitudes: An Effect of Schools or 
Schooling?” Theory and Research in Social Education 11(2):35–52. 
Dey, Eric. 1996. “Undergraduate Political Attitudes: An Examination of Peer, Faculty, and 
Social Influences.” Research in Higher Education 37(5):535–54. 
Finney, Henry. 1974. “Political Dimensions of College Impact on Civil-Libertarianism and the 
Integration of Political Perspective: A Longitudinal Analysis.” Sociology of Education 
47(2):214–50. 
Greenstein, Fred. 1969. Children and Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Hanson, Jana, Dustin Weeden, Ernest Pascarella, and Charles Blaich. 2012. “Do Liberal Arts 
Colleges Make Students More Liberal? Some Initial Evidence.” High Education 64:355–
69. 
Inc, Gallup. 2007. “Party Affiliation.” Gallup.Com. Retrieved January 13, 2020 
(https://news.gallup.com/poll/15370/Party-Affiliation.aspx). 
 89 
Inc, Gallup. 2019a. “Half in U.S. Now Consider College Education Very Important.” 
Gallup.Com. Retrieved January 13, 2020 
(https://www.gallup.com/education/272228/half-consider-college-education-
important.aspx). 
Inc, Gallup. 2019b. “Non-College Whites Had Affinity for GOP Before Trump.” Gallup.Com. 
Retrieved January 13, 2020 (https://news.gallup.com/poll/248525/non-college-whites-
affinity-gop-trump.aspx). 
Inc, Gallup. 2019c. “Understanding Shifts in Democratic Party Ideology.” Gallup.Com. 
Retrieved January 13, 2020 (https://news.gallup.com/poll/246806/understanding-shifts-
democratic-party-ideology.aspx). 
Inc, Gallup. 2019d. “U.S. Still Leans Conservative, but Liberals Keep Recent Gains.” 
Gallup.Com. Retrieved January 14, 2020 (https://news.gallup.com/poll/245813/leans-
conservative-liberals-keep-recent-gains.aspx). 
Inc, Gallup. 2020. “The U.S. Remained Center-Right, Ideologically, in 2019.” Gallup.Com. 
Retrieved January 13, 2020 (https://news.gallup.com/poll/275792/remained-center-right-
ideologically-2019.aspx). 
Kaiser, Fred, and J. Robert Lilly. 1975. “Political Attitudes among Students: A Small College 
Experience.” Adolescence 10(38):287–95. 
Kowalski, Robin M. 2007. “Bennington College Study.” in Encyclopedia of Social Psychology. 
2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks California 91320 United States: SAGE Publications, 
Inc. 
Kuh, George. 1995. “The Other Curriculum: Out-of-Class Experiences Associated with Student 
Learning and Personal Development.” The Journal of Higher Education 66(2):123–55. 
Langton, Kenneth. 1967. “Peer Group and School and the Political Socialization Process.” The 
American Political Science Review 61(3):751–58. 
Leighley, Jan E., and Jonathan Nagler. 2014. “Demographics of Turnout.” Pp. 16–51 in Who 
Votes Now?, Demographics, Issues, Inequality, and Turnout in the United States. 
Princeton University Press. 
Ma-Kellams, Christine, Aida Rocci Ruiz, Jacqueline Lee, and Andrea Madu. 2014. “Not All 
Education Is Equally Liberal: The Effects of Science Education on Political Attitudes.” 
Journal of Social and Political Psychology 2(1):143–63. 
Mariani, Mack, and Gordon Hewitt. 2008. “Indoctrination U.? Faculty Ideology and Changes in 
Student Political Orientation.” American Political Science and Politics 41(4):773–83. 
Mendelberg, Tali, Katherine T. McCabe, and Adam Thal. 2017. “College Socialization and the 
Economic Views of Affluent Americans.” American Journal of Political Science 
61(3):606–23. 
 90 
Milem, Jeffrey. 1998. “Attitude Change in College Students: Examining the Effect of College 
Peer Groups and Faculty Normative Groups.” The Journal of Higher Education 
69(2):117–40. 
NW, 1615 L. St, Suite 800Washington, and DC 20036USA202-419-4300 |. Main202-857-8562 |. 
Fax202-419-4372 |. Media Inquiries. n.d. “Educational Divide in Vote Preferences on 
Track to Be Wider than in Recent Elections.” Pew Research Center. Retrieved November 
12, 2019 (https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/15/educational-divide-in-vote-
preferences-on-track-to-be-wider-than-in-recent-elections/). 
NW, 1615 L. St, Suite 800 Washington, and DC 20036 USA202-419-4300 |. Main202-419-4349 
|. Fax202-419-4372 |. Media Inquiries. 2016. “The Changing Composition of the U.S. 
Political Parties.” Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. Retrieved January 
13, 2020 (https://www.people-press.org/2016/09/13/1-the-changing-composition-of-the-
political-parties/). 
Parker, Kim. 2019. “Views of Higher Education Divided by Party.” Pew Research Center’s 
Social & Demographic Trends Project. Retrieved January 14, 2020 
(https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/essay/the-growing-partisan-divide-in-views-of-higher-
education/). 
Phelan, Jo, Bruce G. Link, Ann Stueve, and Robert E. Moore. 1995. “Education, Social 
Liberalism, and Economic Conservatism: Attitudes Toward Homeless People.” American 
Sociological Review 60(1):126–40. 
Prager, Dennis. 2019. “Coming Home From College.” National Review. Retrieved May 2, 2020 
(https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/03/college-indoctrination-leftism-rampant/). 
Routon, P. Wesley, and Jay K. Walker. 2016. “Attitude Changes and Self-Perceived Skill Gains 
from Collegiate Greek Organization Membership*.” Social Science Quarterly 97(3):807–
22. 
Sachs, Jeffrey. 2020. “No, Professors Are Not Brainwashing Their Students.” Medium. Retrieved 
February 5, 2020 (https://arcdigital.media/no-professors-are-not-brainwashing-their-
students-d4694522f413). 
Weidman, John. 1989. “Undergraduate Socialization: A Conceptual Approach.” Pp. 289–322 in 
Higher Education: Handbook of Theory and Research. Vol. V. New York: Agathon 
Press. 
Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Orgins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
